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ACCOUNT. See APPLICATION OF PAYMENTS, 1.
In matters of account, one party may credit the other items that represent
a legal indebtedness that should go into the account, and thereby avoid the
bar of the Statute of Limitations, although the other party has not charged
the items and insists that they are not to be allowed him. Davis v. Snith, 115.
ACCRETION. See RIPARIAN RIGHTS.
ACTION. See BANKRUPTCY, 3; COMMON CARRIER, 8; CONTRACT, 2, 16;
FRAUDS, STATUTE OF, 6.
1. Cannot be maintained on a transaction prohibited under a penalty by
statute. T/lorne v. Travellers' Ins. Co., 122.
2. If one wishes to intervene and become a party to a suit in which he is
interested, he must not only petition to the court to that effect, but his peti-
tion must be granted. Ex parte Cutting, 307.
3. Although a deed is inter partes, a covenant therein made with a third
person may he enforced by such third person by suit, if it clearly appears by
the instrument that it was the intention to confer such right. National Bank
v. Segur, 497.
4. The mere presence in such deed of a covenant with a third person will
not be eviacive by its own force of such intention. Id.
5. In an action to recover moneys paid to a town for a license to sell in-
toxicating liquors, under an invalid penal ordinance adopted under a void
statute, the complaint averred that such payment was made "for the purpose
of avoiding the penalty and -forfeiture," &c., "and to save himself from ar-
rest and imprisonment for violating the provisions of said ordinance, as pro-
vided for by statute :" Held, that such complaint does not show that such pay-
ment was not voluntary, and is therefore bad on demurrer for want of sufficient
facts. Town of Brazil v. Kress, 691.
6. Where of certain stock stolen and purchnsed by a third party, the owner
replevied a portion and afterward brought trover for the remainder, and it
appeared that at the time of the first suit he had knowledge of the conversion
of a portion of the stock claimed in the second, Held, that for that portion his
second action would not lie, but contrawise as to that touching the conversion
of which he was ignorant. The rule prohibiting multiplicity of suits has no
reference to a case where the party has no knowledge of his means of redress.
Moran v. Planinton, 569.
ACTS OF CONGRESS.
1789. See ERRORS AND APPEALS, 6.
1790, May 26. See EVIDENCE, 1.
1852.March 30. See SHIPPING. 11.
1864,'June 30. See APPLICATION OF PAYMENTS, 6 ; TAXATION, 3.
1867, Mfarch 2. See CoURTS, 1 ; REMOVAL OF CAUSES, 2, 5.
1874, Revised Statutes.
Sect. .359. See UNITED STATES, 2.
Seat. 639. See REMOVAL OF CAUSES, 3.
Sect. 692. See ERRORS AND APPEALS, 9.
Sect. 5063. Seb BANKRUPTCY. 8.
1875, March 3. See REMOVAL*OF CAUSES, 1, 3, 5.
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ADMIRALTY. See SNiPPitNG.
I. coWlision.
1. Owners of ships and vessels are not liable for any loss, damage or injury
by collision, if occasioned witiout their privity or knowledge, beyond the
amount of their interest in such ship or vessel, and her freight pending at the
time the collision occurred. Steamboat Atlas v. Phenix Ins. Co., 116.
2. The reception of the amount of loss from the insurers is no bar to an
action subsequently commenced against the wrongdoer to recover compensa-
tion for the injury occasioned by the collision. Id.
3. The owners of a ship or vessel injured in collision may elect to recover
compensation either against the owners or against the master personally, or
against the ship herself. Id.
4. The cargo on board the colliding vessel is not liable for the damage
done by the ship in which it is carried. Id.
5. Where both vessels are in fault, the positive rule of the Court of Admi-
ralty requires the damages to be equally divided. Id.
6. Wherever a maritime lien arises the libellant or plaintiff may waive the
lien in the admiralty and pursue his remedy by a suit in personam, or hd may
institute an action at law, if the common law is competent to give him that
remedy. Norton v. Switzer, 183.
7. While it is in general the duty of a steamer to keep out of the way of a
sailing vessel, it is, on the other hand, equally the duty of the latter to allow
the steamer to keep out of her way and not to embarrass or hamper her in so
doing. Marshall v. Steamship Adriatic, 491.
. 8. Under circumstances where the vacillating course of one vessel imposes
on ihe other, a second or third time, the duty of avoiding her, and the danger
of collision is imminient, very much must be conceded to the judgment of the
navigator of the latter. Id.
9. Sdiling vessels approaching a steamer are required to keep their course
on account of the correlative duty of the steamer to keep out of the way..
Day et al. v. Good, 569.
10. Where b6th vessels are in fault where a collision occurs, the damages
must be divided. Id.
11. A vessel, when apprised of the helpless condition.of another, which
ought to get out of her way, is bound to execute an y practicable manmuvre °
which would tend to avoid a collision. Wrlson v. Canada Sipping Co., 625.
12. It is the duty of a vessel lying at moorings during a gale to have chains
bent and lookout on deck. T7w Pladda, 497.
II. Criminal Law.
13. The prisoner was indicted for manslaughter. Hewas a foreigner Rod
in command of a foreign ship, passing within three miles of the shore of
England on a voyage to a foreign port; and whilst within that distance he ran
his ship into a British ship and sank her, whereby a passenger on board the
latter ship was drowned. The facts of the case were such as to amount to
manslaughter by English law: Held, by the majority of the court, that prior
to 28 Hen. 8, c. 15, the admiral had no jurisdiction to try offences by
foreigners on board foreign ships, whether within or without the limit of three
miles from the shore of. England; that that and the subsequent statutes only
transferred to the common-law courts the jurisdiction formerly possessed by
the admiral ; and that, therefore, in the absence of statutory enactment, the
court had no power to try such an offence. Also, by some of the judges, on
the ground that, by the principles of international law, the power of a nation
within three miles of its coasts is only for certain limited purposes ; and that
parliament could not, consistently with those principles, apply English criminal
law within those limits. 7%e Queen v. Keyn, 308.
III. Salvage.
14. A cause of distribution of salvage was instituted on behalf of some of
the crew of a steamship against the owners. The owners alleged that, subse-
quently to the salvage services, but before any amount had been paid in respect
of such services, fourteen of the plaintiffs had bv deed, in consideration of
sums varying from l. to 10s., paid them by the defendants, assigned to the
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defendants all their respective shares of salvage reward. The court on
demurrer held the assignment void under the Act of 17 & 18 Vict., and
semble, it would be void at common law as inequitable. The Rosario, 497.
IV. Steam 'ug.
15. A steam tug is not a common carrier or insurer. The highest possible
degree of skill and care are not required of her. She is bdund, however, to
bring to the performance of the duty she assumes reasonable skill and care,
and to exercise them in everything relating to the work she undertakes until
it is accomplished. Thompson v. Bliss et al. The Margaret, 442.
ADVANCEMENT.
1. Where real estate is conveyed by a father to a child, the legal presump-
tion is that it was intended to be an advancement, which is greatly strength-
ened when the value of the land bears any considerable proportion to the
father's whole estate. Storey's Appeal, 625.
2. The question of advancement can only arise in cases of total intestacy.
Pole v. Simmons 6" Pole, Ex'rs, et aL., 692.
AGENT.
1. Declarations made by the officers of a bank, but not in the course of
their duties as officers or agents of the bank, although wilfully false, cannot
affect the bank. .Mfapes v. Second National Bank, 52.
2. Unlawful acts are not presumed to be authorized. Green and Wife v.
Town of Woodbury, 116.
3. One- who knows that another is assuming to act for him must disaffirm
the assumed authority within a reasonable time or he will be held liable.
Saveland v. Green, 183.
4. Although a private agent, acting in violation of spdcific instructions,
yet within the scope of his general authority, may bind his principal, the rule
as to a public agent is otherwise. iteside v. The United States, 184.
5. Torts committed by an officer in the service of the United States do not
render the government liable in an implied assumpsit even though the acts
done were apparently for the public benefit. Id.
6. Where the names -of the principal and agent both appear on an instru-
ment, it will be held to be the bill or note of him who signs it, unless he
signed it in a mere ministerial character. Powers v. Briggs, 308.
7. Ratification is only binding when made on full knowledge of the facts
as they actually exist. Owensboro Saiings Bank v. Western Bank, 344.
8. The good faith of the agent does not exonerate him from liability to his
principal if he has been in fact negligent or has disregarded orders. Id.
9. Where an agent to loan money takes insufficient security, the principal
is not bound at his peril to accept it and discharge the agent or to reject it
and look only to the responsibility of the agent; he may take the security
and still hold the agent for any deficiency which, after due diligence, he suffers
on it. Id.
10. Where the owner and proprietor of a hotel employs an agent to run
the same, and holds him out as manager thereof, a jury will be warranted in.
finding that such agent had authority to purchase the usual and necessary sup-
plies for the hotel, and bind his employer to pay for the same. Beecher v.
Venn, 442.
11. DOCTRINE- OF NoTve. To PnrxciAL, rom :PREvIous KNOwLEDGE
or AGENT, 1.
AIJUVION. See RIPARIAN RIGHTS.
APPLICATI'N OF PAYMIENTS.
1. In -ases of long and running accounts, where debts and credits are per-
petually occurring and no balances are otherwise adjusted than for the mere
purpose of making rests, payments ought to be applied to extinguish the debts
according to the priority of time. Pickering v. Day, 692.
2. An exception to such general rule is the case of several official bonds
executed by a collector or receiver of public revenue at different times, with
distinct sets of sureties. Id.
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3. In such case a court of equity will so appropriate the payments as to
give each bond credit for the money due and collected under it. Pickering v.
Day, 692.
4. An apportionment of the amounts due on several successive official bonds
respectively, endorsed on the bonds and signed by the sureties the-ein, is con-
clusive, in the absence of fraud or mistake. Id.
5. The omission of a collector of public revenue to remove a deputy col-
lector, after knowledge of default by the latter, does not discharge the sure-
ties of deputy collector. Id.
6. The provision of the Act of Congress of June 30th 1864, does not apply
to collectors appointed under a prior act and who are continued in office under
a saving clause in such act. .d.
7. Where a debtor, who owes several distinct debts, makes a Payment, he
may apply such payment to any debt which he chooses; and if he does not
make the application then the creditor may do so ; but if neither makes any
such application, then the law will make the application in the manner which
is most equitable, and, in doing so, the law will generally apply the payment
to the oldest debt, or to the earliest item of the same debt, or to a debt that fs
due in preference to one that is not due ; and generally where one debt is
secured, and the other is not, the law will apply the payment to the debt
which is not secured. ,Shellabarger v. Binns, 571.
ARBITRATION.
1. It is essential that the arbitrator award upon all the subjects embraced
in the submission that are heard by him, and upon which his judgment is
required; but, where the submission, in terms, comprehends all matters in
4ifference, it is competent for the parties to submit just such matters as they
elect, and his award upon such matters is conclusive. Young v. Kinney, 52.
2. Every reasonable intendment is to be made in favor of an award. Id.
3. An award must be unanimous, unless otherwise provided in the submis-
sion. Ifarryman v. Ilarryman, 52.
4. Where, from a dissension among arbitrators, the award fails, the refer-
ence is at an end unless renewed by agreement of the parties. Id.
5. A clause in a submission that "in the event of either of the parties dis-
puting the validity of the award, or moving the court to set it, or any part of
it, aside, the court shall have power to remit the natters referred, or any of
them, to the reconsideration and determination of the arbitrators making such
award," is unavailing, where the arbitrators do not agree. Id.
6. A right to litigate as a party involves the right to submit to arbitration.
Remington v. Harrison County Court, 247.
ASSAULT AND BATTERY. See CRIMINAL LAW, II.; FoRmER A3)xIDxcA-
TION, 5; TRESPASS, 1.
ASSIGNMENT. See BANKRUPTCY, 17; CONTRACT, 9; DEBT6R AND CRED-
ITOR, 4-7; ToRT, 1.
ASSUMPSIT. See AGENT, 5.
1. Where there has been a special contract, the whole of which has been
executed on the part of the plaintiff, and the time of payment on the other
side has passed, a suit may either be brought on the special contract, or a
general assumpsit may be maintained; and in the latter case the measure of
damages will be the rate of recompense fixed by the special contract. Apple-
man v. Michael, 53.
2. There is no implied assumpsit that the president and directors of a rail-
way company, occupying the position of trustees of the funds and property
of the company, shall be entitled to any compensation for their ordinary ser-
vices as such officers, unless the salary as fixed by the by-laws or a resolution
of the board, before the services are performed. Gridley v. L., B. 4- Hl.
Railroad Co., 53.
3. When a promise of payment or some other contract or thing to be done
has been relied upon as the consideration of a deed, and the grantee refuses to
pay or perform, the grantor may recover the value of his property as upon
an implied assumptit. Barter v. Greenleof, 56.
INDEMX. 765
ASSUMPSIT.
4. Where the agreement is that defendant should have time on giving a
note with surety, and such note is not given, plaintiffs may sue at once in
general assumpsit. Hlale 4- Fish v. Jones, 116.
5. In a suit for money paid for use of another, the plaintiff must establish
the facts that he had made such payments and that it was made on the
authority of defendant. Lucas v. .Jarrell, Ex'r, 692.
ATTACHMENT.
The salary of a public officer in the hands of the disbursing officer of the
government cannot be attached. Remmey ct al. v. Gedney, 250.
ATTORNEY. See LIKITATIONS, STATUTE OF, 1. WITNESS, 1.
1. When an attorney publishes advertisements without any signature, rep-
rescnting that he can procure divorces for causes not known to the law, his
name should be stricken from the roll. Th7e People v. Goodrich, 309.
2. An attorney before judgment, has po lien to defeat a settlement of the
parties. Averill v. Loaygldlow, 442.
BAILMENT. See SET-OFF, 5.
1. In the case of a strict pledge, if the pledgee transfers the same to his
own creditor, the latter may hold the pledge until the debt of the original
owner is discharged. Talty v. Frc&lman's S. - T. Co., 184.
2. A tender to the second pledgee of the amount due from the first pledger
to the first pledgee, extinguishes ipsotfacto the title of the second pledgee, but
there can be no recovery against him without tender of payment. Id.
BANK. See NATIONAL BANK.
Power nf a national bank to receive on deposit bonds as collateral security
for the existing debts of a creditor, and for future loans and discounts, and as
to liability of a national bank fbr the loss of bonds deposited for such purpose.
T ird National Bank of Bl~dtimore v. Boyd, 370.
BANKRUPTCY.
I. E,Tct of Proeeedings.
1. The Supreme Court of the United States cannot review the action of the
Circuit Courts in the exercise of their supervisory jurisdiction under the bank-
rupt law. lViswcdl v. Cmpbell et al., 309.
2. A proceeding to prove a debt is part of a suit in bankruptcy. It has
none of the qualities of an independent suit at law or in equity. Id.
3. A promise to pay a debt discharged by proceedings in bankruptcy is
valid and will support an action. Ecklar v. Galbraith, 78.
4. But i it be a conditional promise to pay when able, the plaintiff must
show ability as part of his case. !d.
5. Promises to pay debts barred by discharge in bankruptcy and by the
Statute of Limitations, discussed. Id., note.
6. Actions pending at the time the debtor is adjudged bankrupt, may be
prosecuted to final judgment to ascertain the amount due only. Norton v.
Switzer, 184.
7. A court of bankruptcy has no authority to order the sale of property
alleged to belong to a bankrupt, where it is in possession of another person
claiming to be the owner. Stanley v. Sutherland, 298.
8. Section 5063 of the Revised Bankrupt Act, relating to the sale of disputed
property and holding the proceeds to abide the result of the determination of
title, does not extend to cdses where another person is in possession under
claim of title. Id.
9. In cases to which that section does extend there must be notice to the
claimant, and without it the proceeding would be void as to him. Id.
10. Property in the possession of A. under claim of title was seized by the
sheriff under an execution from a state court as the property of B. A petition
in bankruptcy was then filed against B., and subsequently an order was made
by the Bankruptcy Court on the sheriff to deliver the property to B.'s assignee,
which he did. An action against the sheriff for trespass in taking the goods
- from him was brought by A. after the petition in bankruptcy had been filed
against B., but before the order to the sheriff to deliver the goods to the
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assignee. Held, that the delivery of the goods to the assignee under the order
of the Bankrupt Court was no defence to the sheriff in such action. Stanley v.
Sutherland, 298.
1t. In such an action it appeared that plaintiff's title was by purchase from
the bankrupt with some knowledge of his affairs-: Held, that the question was
not whether the title of plaintiff was invalid under the Bankrupt Act, but
whether it was good or not under the state law. Neither the assignee nor any
one entitled to question the validity of the sale'under the Bankrupt Act being
party to the action, the Bankrupt Act had no application whatever. d.
12. Mere liability as surety for a bankrupt, does not constitute a claim
which may be proved against him under the Bankrupt Act. The debt must
be actually paid by the surety before be has a claim provable in bankruptcy.
Ecker v. Bohn, 693.
M. Preferences. See LANDLORD AND TENANT, 2.
13. A transfer of property by an insolvent debtor, within four months
before the filing of the petition in bankruptcy against such debtor, is void, if
the person receiving the same or to be benefited thereby had reasonable cause
to believe that such debtor was insolvent, and that such transfer was made in
fraud of the provisions of the Bankrupt Act. Dutcher v. Wright, 371.
14. A creditor maybe said to have reasonable cause to believe his debtor
to be insolvent when such a state of facts is brought to his notice as would
lead a prudent man to the conclusion that the debtor is unable to meet his
obligations, as they mature in the ordinary course of his business. Id.
15. Under the Bankrupt Act, the computation of time shall be reckoned,
in the absence of any expression to the contrary, exclusive of the first, and
inclusive of the last day, unless the last day shall be dies non within the judi- -
cial sense. Id.
16. Where the computation is to be made from an act done, the day on
which the act is done to be included. Id.
TIT. Assignee. Sea COstPORATION, 26.
17. Where property was settled by a husband contemplating bankruptcy on
his wife, and she sold it to a purchaser with notice of the fraud: Held, that
the assignee of the bankrupt could follow the property into the hands of said
purchaser, but that the separate estate of the wife was not liable. Phipps v.
Sedgwick, 442.
IV. Discharge.
18. A debt for contribution to a co-surety who has paid the debt is dis-
charged in bankruptcy. Rays v. Ford, 693.
BILL OF EXCEPTIONS. See M.ANDAmu, 3.
BIL.L OF LADING. See SnI'RPING, 3, 9.
BILLS AND NOTES.
L Form, consideration, t'c.
1. A note payable to the order of W. was before issue endorsed by F. It
was signed by G., and this signature, was at the request of W. changed to
"G., agent." The note was given for G.'s private debt. F. did not assent
to the change, and there was no evidence to show that G.'s principals were
accustomed to pay notes drawn in this form. In an action against F. : Held,
that the change was immaterial: Held, further, that F. was not entitled to
notice of non-payment. Manuf. and Mer. Bank v. Follett, 372.
2. A clause in a promissory note allowing a commission upon its face, as
a collection-fee, in case of its non-payment at maturity, destroys its negotia-
bility. Woods v. North, 667.
3. Where a negotiable promissory note was made payable upon a condition
and the condition was written below the note on the same piece of paper, Ield,
that the note and condition were parts of a single entire contract, and that the
fraudulent removal of the condition, by tearing the paper, was such a
material alteration as rendered the note void in the hands of a bond fide
holder. Gerrish v. Gl;no.,. 274.
4. It is no part of the official duty of a notary public to give notice of the
protest or dishonor of a bill or note. Swaze v. Britton, 872.
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5. An agreement to forbear suit on a pre-existing debt is, a sufficient con-
sideration for a note given therefor ; and an agreement so to forbear until tile
maturity of the note will be presumed, in the absence of proQf to the contrary.
Ilolzworth v. Koch, 148.
6. Partial failure of consideration is no bar to -an action on a promissory
note, but merely entitles the mal~er to recoupment for damages, or abatement
of the plaintiff's demand, to the extent the maker has suffered loss by the
failure. Id.
7. Parol evidence is admissible to show the consideration of a note, and to,
show that the consideration in whole or in part has failed; but it cannot be
received to contradict the terms of the note, or to attach to it conditions. ld.
IL Rights of the Parties.
8. A uegotiable promissory note given for a patent right without the words,
"given for a patent right," inserted therein as required by statute, is good in
the hands of a bona fide holder for value, who takes it before maturity and
without notice 'of what it was given for. Pendar v. Kelley, 53.
9. A person passing bank bills, or commercial paper, or making sale of a
chose in action, guarantees the genuineness of the instrument. Tyler v.
Bailey, 53.
10. Though a note is procured as to a surety by the fraud of the principal
maker, it is not affected by. such fraud in the bands of an innocent payee.
Anterson v. Warne, 53.
11. Fraud or illegality in the inception of a negotial.le promissory note
transferred before maturity, will vitiate the same in the hands of a person
having knowledge of the fraud or illegality ; and when such fraud or ille-
gality is established, the burden of proof is devolved upon the holder, to show
that he tbok the note in good faith or for value. Hamilton v. Marks, 37.
12. A bond fide holder for value, however, is vested with a good tide, not-
withstanding there may have been circumstances connected with the transfer
to him sufficient to put an ordinarily prudent man on inquiry. Id.
13. To defeat the recovery of a bondfide holder of a note, it must be shown
that he took the paper under circumstances showing bad faith or want of hon-
esty on his part; *want of care is not sufficient. Johnson v. Mray, 117.
14. A bank, being the holder of a promissory note protested for non-pay-
mert, has not the right to credit it with deposits made by the debtor to his a-
count as a justice of the peace ; and its omission to do so does not discharge
the endorser. McDowell v. Bank of Wilmington, 6-c., 185.
15. An agreement between the creditor and the principal debtor, in order
to discharge the surety must be such as gives time to the debtor; and it must
be for a consideration. Id.
16. The maker of a promissory note, after a judgment recovered against
the endorser, not a competent witness for the endorser in a suit in equity to
restrain the collection of the judgment. Id.
17. In the case of the sale of a promissory note for a sum payable in instal-
ments, and circumstances occur showing the existence of fraud, the purchaser
can recover back the sum paid before notice of the fraud, but not that paid
afterwards. Dresser v. Railway Construction Co., 251.
18. In such a case, one who pays with knowledge of a fraud is in no better
position than if lie had not paid at all. Id.
19. Holders of a negotiable instrument are entitled to the presumption that
it was negotiated for value in the usual coarse of business at the time of its
execution. Collins v. Gilbert et al., 498.
20. Nothing short of fraud, not even gross negligence, if unattended with
malafides, is sufficient to invalidate the title of the holder supported by that
presumption. Id.
21. A person signed a note without reading it, relying solely upon the rep-
resentation of the payee that the paper was an instrument other than a note.
Held, as against a bona fide holder before maturity for value, such maker
will not be permitted to deny the due execution of the note. Winchell v.
Crider, 499. See ante 3.
22. A person who negligently signs and delivers to another a printed form
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or a negotiable promissory note containing blanks, without knowing it to be
such, is estopped as against a subsequent bonafide holder for value and before
due, from denying authority in the person to whom it was delivered to fill the
blanks. Ross v. Doland, 499.
23 When at the time of signing and delivering a note, the maker was
induced by fraudulent representations, without negligence on his part, as to
the character of the paper, to believe tlhat he was signing an instrument other
than a promissory note, he is not liable. DeCamp v. Banana, 626.
24. A note may be executed and endorsed in blank and if so delivered to
an agent and he fills it up differently from his orders, the maker and endorser
will be bound to a bona fide holder for value. Joic2 h v. First National
Bank, 373.
III. Endorsement, Acceptance, 1-c.
25. An endorser is competent to prove an agreement in writing with its
holder at the time of endorsement, that he shall not be held liable thereon,
where the paper is held by the party to whom the bndorsement was made.
Davis v. Brown, 476.
26. The case of the Bank of United States v. Dunn, 6 Peters 51, explained
and qualified. Id.
27. An agreement like the one mentioned above and the endorsement,
taken together, are equivalent, so f= as the holder of the note is concerned,
to an endorsement without recourse to the endorser. Id.
28. The liabilities implied by endorsing a note can be qualified or restricted
by express terms. Adams v. Blethen, 309.
29. The payee of a negotiable note vho signed his name on the back of it,
under the iWords, "I this day sold and delivered to Catherine 31. Adams the
within note," may be held as an endorser of the note in a suit thereon in the
name of Catherine Mf. Adams. Id.
30. The debtor of a bank, of which A. was cashier, transferred a negotiable
note, in piyment of his indebtedness, to A. by special endorsement, and
thereupon the bank, to enable A. to bring suit thereon, assigned its interest
in the note to him. Held, that A. might maintain an action on the note in
his own name, notwithstanding he may be accountable to the bank for the
proceeeds when collected. White v. Stanleyj, 626.
31. The holder of a bill of exchange which was dishonored after the appoint-
ment of a trustee in bankruptcy of the drawer, sent notice of the dishonor to
the drawer by post to the address which he had left for some months.* Held,
that that address being the only one with which the holder was acquainted,
the notice was sufficient. In re Bellman, 626.
32. Notice to the drawer is sufficient, though be has been adjudicated a
bankrupt. Id.
33. An endorsement cannot be varied by parol. Charles v. Denis, 694.
BOUNDARY. See RIPARIAN RIGHTS, 1.
BROKER.
A broker employed by A. to negotiate an exchange of properties between
him and B., cannot recover commissions of B., although after the exchange
was effected he expressly promised to pay. Lynch v. Fallen, 331.
BURIAL. See CoaPsE.
CASES APPROVED, EXPLAINED, &c.
Bank of the United States v. Dunn, 6 Peters 51, explained. Davis V.
Brown, 476.
Northern Central Railroad Co. v. Scholl, 16 Md. 331, distinguished. State
v. Pittsbargh 4- Connellsville Railroad Co., 681.
CHARITABLE USES.
1. Charitable uses are not within the rule of law against perpetuities. State
v. Grtffith, 694.
2. A devise of real estate, with a direction that the same be not sold, but
rented, "the proceeds arising from such rents" to be applied to certain char-
itable uses, Hed, not to be within the law against perpetuities. Id.
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3. The jurisdiction of the court of chancery, to protect and enforce chari-
table uses, existed in the Court of Chancery prior to the statute 43 Elibeth,
and is not founded on that statute. Sate v. Griffith, 694.
CHARTER PARTY. See SHPPING, 13, 14.
CHATTEL MORTGAGE. See MORTGAGE, 1-4, 13.
CHURCH. See CORPORATIO N, 5.
COLLISION. See ADMIRALTY, L
COMMON CARRIER. See RAILROAD.
1. An express company is required, as a common carrier, to deliver the
goods to the consignee at his residence or place of business. And where
directions are given to that effect by the consignor, the express company must
collect the price for which the goods are sold by the consignor to the con-
signee, and return the money to the consignor. American Hercdants Union
Express Co. v. Wolf, 309.
2. A common carrier cannot by any contract relieve himself from respon-
sibility for his own negligence or that of his servants, and ibis includes the
negligence of a connecting railroad employed in the transportation, though
not under his control. Bank of Kentucky v. Adams Express Co., 185.
3. A common carrier is liable for the loss of a box or parcel, however
valuable, though ignorant of its contents, unless he make a special accept-
ance. Little v. Boston and Maine Railroad Co., 442.
4. Common carriers may, by contract or notice brought home to the owner,
restrict their liability against loss, but not against negligence. Id.
5. The measure of damages is the value of the goods lost at the place of
destination. 1d
6. Where a box, improperly directed, was delivered to a railroad company
for transportation, and was safely carried to its destination, and there, after
due diligence exercised to ascertain the consignee, was delivered to the wrong
person, the company was not liable for the loss. Lake Shore and Michigan
Suthern Railway Co. v. Rodapp, 626.
7. A carrier of freight is, as against the acts of the shipper, bound to the
exercise of reasonable care and diligence only. Ross v. Troy and Boston
Railroad Co., 695.
8. The shipper of machinery, who lived in R., was under contract to erect
a building for the consignees, in P., and furnish jt with machinery for a gross
sum, the consignees paying freight on the machinery. Held, that the shipper
might maintain an action against the carrier for injuries done to the ma-
chinery while in transit. rd.
CONFEDERATE STATES. See CONTRACT, 4.
Whatever jurisdiction might be accorded to a court of one of the Confederate
States during the war of the rebellion, as between citizens of the Confederate
States, such a court could acquire no jurisdiction of citizens of the United States
residing and being at the time in the states adhering to the government of the
United States. Ketchum v. Mobile and Ohio Railroad Co., 246.
CONFLICT OF LAWS. See JUDGMENT, 4, 8.
1. Where A., a resident of Michigan, gives an order in that state to B., a
citizen and resident of Ohio, for the purchase of liquors, and B. accepts it in
Michigan, it is- a contract made in Michigan, and void under the liquor law
of that state. Webber v. Howe, 425.
2. Had B. been a mere agent, without authority to sell, but merely to take
orders for transmission to Ohio for acceptance there, the contract might have
been sustained as an Ohio contract. Id.
3. A contract void when made because of a statutory prohibition may be
validated by subsequent legislation. Id.
4. The lex loci contractus determines the nature, validity and construction
of contracts ; the lex fori determines the remedieq for their enforcement.




5. In order to render a contract void for usury, it must be tainted with that
offence in its inception. Lindsay v. Hill, 443.
6. The court of the place of contract of marriage is not bound to recog-
nise the incapacities affixed by the law of the domicile on the parties to a con-
tract of marriage, if such incapacities do not exist according to the lex loci
contractus. Sottomay]or v. DeBarros, 631.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
L Powers of Congress.
1. The compact between South Carolina and Georgia, made in 1787, by
which the boundary between the two states should be the Savannah river,
has no effect upon the subsequent constitutional provision that Congress shall
have power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among" the sevreal
states. State of South Carolina v. State of Georgia, 54.
2. Congress has the same power over the Savannah river that it has over
the other navigable waters of the United States. Id.
3. The right to regulate commerce includes the right to regulate navigation,
and hence to regulate and improve navigable rivers. Id..
4. The power of Congress to regulate commerce is exclusive. State legis-
lation thereon is void. Foster Y. Master and Wardens, 443.
IL Powers of the tate Legislatures. See MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONr, 2.
5. Where the term of a public office is fixed by the constitution, the legis-
lature cannot, directly or indirectly, remove the incumbent. Fant v. Auditor
of Public Accounts, 737.
6. A state law fixing a maximum charge for the storage of grain in bulk
in warehouses within the state, in which the grain of various owners is mixed
together, and the identity of the different lots is destroyed, is not contrary to
the Constitution of the United States. Munn - Scott v. The People, 526.
7. Such a statute is not a regulation of commerce which is prohibited to
the states; nor is it a preference of the ports of one state, which is a limita-
tion on the powers of Congress and does not apply to the regulation by a
state of its domestic concerns; nor is it a depriving of the warahouseman
of property without due process of law within the prohibition of the 14th
Amendment. Id.
8. Statutes regulating the use or even the price of property do not necessa-
rily deprive the owner of the property within the legl sense of that term. Id.
. 9. All property which is affected with a public interest ceases to be juris
privti only and becomed subject to regulation for the public benefit, and pro-
perty is affected with a public interest whenever it is devoted to such use as
to make it of public consequence and to directly affect the community at
large. Id.
10. Hence the legislative power, both in England and in this country, has
always extended to the regulation of common carriers, innkeepers, ferrymen,
warehousemen and others in similar employments of public interest; and the.
question of what is a relsonable charge by such persons for their services or
the use of their property, has from time immemorial been deemed, in com-
mon-law countries, a legislative and not a judicial question. .d.
11. A storage place for grain in bulk, such as is described in the statute
above referred to, is a warehouse within these rules of the common law. Id.
12. An act of state laying a duty on tonnage is void. Inman Steamship Co.
r. Tinker, 499.
13. When an inferior tribunal fails to pursue the provisions of a legislative
grant and to keep within it, the right of the Supreme Court to review the
efoneous proceedings attaches. Traphagen v. West Hoboken, 500.
-14. A legislative act prohibiting a writ of certiorari in such case is uncon-
stitutional and void. Id.
15. A reasonable time may be limited within which the writ in such case
shall be sued out. Id.
16. Until Congress makes some regulation touching the liabilities of parties
for marine torts resulting in death of the persons injured, a state statute giving
a right of action to the representatives of the deceased applies, the tort being
committed within the territorial limits of the state; and as thus applied it
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constitutes no encroachment upon the commercial power of Congress. aS7er-
lock v. Alling, 455.
17. The action of Congress as to a regulation of commerce or the liability
for its infringement, is exclusive of state authority; but until some action is
taken by Congress, the legislation of a state not directed against commerce or
any of its regulations, but relating generally to the rights, duties and liabili-
ties of citizens, is of obligatory force within its territorial jurisdiction, although
it may indirectly and remotely affect the operations of foreign or inter-state
commerce, or persons engaged in such commerce. Id.
18. An agreement to abstain in all cases from resorting to the courts of the
United States is void as against public policy, and a statute requiring such an
agreement is void. Doyle v. Continental Ins. Co., 336.
19. A state has the right to impose conditions to the transaction of business
within its territory by an insurance company chartered by another state, which
are not in conflict with the constitution oriaws of the United States. -It has
the right entirely to exclude such corporation from its territory, or having
given a license, to' revoke it, in its discretioni, for good cause, or without cause.
The motive or intention of the state in so doing is not open to inquiry. Id.
20. Save by the voluntary license of the state, a foreign insurance company
has no right to carry on its business within that state, and as the state may
prohibit it may grant the right on conditions, such as the release of the right
of removal of actions from the state to the federal courts. &ate ex re. Drake
v. Do'le, 186.
21. When a contest arises as to whether an act of the legislature has been
constitutionally passed the journal of either house may be appealed to to settle.
it. Town of South Ottawa v. Perkinsi 186.
22. Laws, however, certified by the secretary of state and published by the
authority of the state, must be received as having passed the legislature in the
manner required by the constitution, unless the contrary clearly appears. Id.
23. A valid statute can only be passed in the manner prescribed by The
constitution, otherwise it must be declared a nullity. Legg v. Mayor, 25.
24. An Act of Assembly which can be shown by undoubted and competent
evidence never to have passed the two houses of the legislature, substantially,
as it was approved by the governor, and sealed with the great seal, and pub-
lished, is a nullity; and it is the duty of the court so to declare it. Id.
III. Taking Private Property; Eminent Domain. See ante 6-10.
25. The franchises or property of one railroad may be taken for the con-
atruction'of another in all cases where the property of an individuel might
be, upon making compensation therefor. The Grand Rapids, N. 4- L. S.
Railroad Co. v. G. R. 4- L Railroad Co., 500.
26. An act extending the taxable limits of a city, and authorizing the
council thereof to assess, levy and collect taxes within the extended limits, is
not repugnant to the constitution which prohibits the taking of private property
for public use, without just compensation. Groff v. The Mayor of Frederick
City, 373.
27. The legislature has the power to create municipal corporations, and
even to abolish them altogether in the legislative discretion. Id.
28. Courts have the right to determine whether the use of private property
proposed to be taken is public in its nature or not, but when the use is public
the judiciary cannot inquire into the necessity or propriety of exercising the
right of eminent domain ; that right belongs exclusively to the legislature.
C. . . 6- P. Railroad Co. v. Town of Lake, 56.
IV. Powers nf.Tudiciary. See ante 13, 14, 18, 24, 28.
29. An action against a state officer as such on a 'matter in which he has
no personal interest, but is sued to affect a state right, the state is the real de-
fendant and the suit is within the prohibition of the constitution. State v.
Doyle, 186.
30. Therefore a federal court cannot enjoin a state officer at the suit of a
foreign corporation, from revoking its license to do business in the state. Id.
V. Presidential Elector.
31. A member of the Centennial Commission holds an office of trust under
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the United States which makes him ineligible as a presidential elector. In re
Corliss, 15.
32. Such ineligibility cannot be removed by a subsequent resignation of the
office. Id.
33. The effect of such ineligibility of the person receiving the highest num-
ber of votes is to avoid the election. It does not elect the person having the next
highest number of votes. Id.
34. CASE OF THE SOUTH CAROLINA STATE CANVASSERS, 129.
CONTEMPT.
1. For sneering, insulting, and disrespectful language used by an attorney
to a judge before whom a matter is pending, concerning such matter and the
judge's ruling thereon, the attorney may be punishea by a fine, as for a con-
tempt. In re Prior, 351.
2. Such language as the following, coming from an attorney to ajudge in
a matter still pending before him: "The ruling you have made is directly
contrary to every principle of law, and everybody knows it, I believe ;" and that
it is "my desire that no such decision shall' stand unreiersed in any court I
practice in," is insulting and disrespectful, and it is immaterial whether this
language is used in oral address in the hearing of others, or in a written com-
munication to the judge. Id.
3. The publication of a libel otra grand jury, which has no tendency directly
to obstruct the grand jury in the discharge of any of its duties remaining to
be performed after the publication is made, cannot be summarily punished as
contempt of court. Storey v. People, 309.
CONTRACT. See CONFLICT OF LAWS; CORPORATxON, I; COVENANT.
1. A contract for the sale and purchase of wheat to be delivered in good
faith at a fiture time is not void as a "wagering contract," but when under
such an agreement it is understood by the parties that no .wheat is to be
delivered, but only a payment at the time appointed of the difference between
the contract and the market price, it thus becomes a wagering contract and
the 14v will not enforce it. Rumsey v. Berry, 54.
2. If one agree to pay and another to take a pertain sum within a certain
time in'settlement of a disputed claim, and payment be not made within the
time, suit may be brought upon the original demand. Piper v. Kingsbury, 117.
3. Any damage or suspension of a right or possibility of a loss occasioned
to the plaintiff by the promise of another, is a sufficient consideration for such
promise, although no actual benefit accrues to the party promising. Hendrick
v. Lindsay, 187.
4. Cotton was purchased by D. in the parish of St. Landry, in the state of
Louisiana, between the 1st of October 1862 and the 1st of April 1863. That
territory was then within the rebel lines. D. was there acting as the agent
of the rebel government in exchanging its bonds for Confederate motes. Hdd,
that D. 's contracts for the cotton w.ere clearly illegal and void and gave him
no title. Desmare v. The United &ates, 310.
5. When a city contracts for-work, said work to be under the supervision
and to the satisfaction of the chief engineer, the city is bound by the action
of its own officer, the said engineer. City of Omaha v. Hammond, 374.
6. There can be no contract without the mutual assent of the parties. This
is equally indispensable to the modification of a contract already made as it
was to making it originally. Utley et al. v. Donaldson et al., 374.
7. The plaintiffs contracted with the defendant to deliver 12,000 carboys of
oil of vitriol; 2000 carboys monthly, during September, October, November
and December 1873, and January and Febrnary 1874. Held, 1. That said
contract must be construed by the intention apparent on its face ; 2. That the
parties could not have considered it entire and indivisible either in quantity
or in the details of its performance. Maryland Fertilizing, 4-c., Co. v. Lo-
rentz, 374.
8. A covenant not to carry on, or be concerned in carrying on, either di-
rectly or indirectly, the business of a saddler, or sell any goods in any way
connected with that trade within a distance of ten miles from C., under a pen-
alty of 1001., to be paid by way of liquidated damages for every such offence,
is broken by selling goods as a journeyman in the employment of a person
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carrying on the particular trade in C. ; and the breach will be restrained by
injunction. Jones v. Heavens, 444.
9. A mere possibility, such as the earning of wages from a future employ-
ment for which there is no existing contract, is not assignable. Kane v.
Clough, 482.
10. Otherwise where there is an existing contract. id.
11. Where a party executes a written release, his right of action against a
railroad company for injuries, and at the said time he is so much under the
influence of drugs and opiates taken to alleviate his pains, that he is mentally
incapacitated to contract, such a release is voidable and not a defence to his
cause of action. Chicago, &-c., Railroad Co. v. Doyle, 484.
12. In such case it was not necessary for him to pay back, nor offer to pay
back, the money received at the time of signing said paper, as a condition
precedent to his right to sue on his zlaim for damages. On the trial the jury
had the right to give the company credit for the money paid at the time the
release, so called, was signed. Id.
13. A gratuitous subscription, to promote the objects for which'a corpora-
tion is established, cannot be enforced unless the promisee has, in reliance on
the promise sued on, done something, or incurred or assumed some liability or
obligation; and it is not sufficient that others were led to subscribe by the
subscription sought to be enforced. CAurch v. Kendall, 546.
14. A. & B. by parol agreed to exchange lands, and entered into possession
in accordance therewith, but neglected to execute deeds. A. having cut off
timber and sold part of the land without offering to perform, was not entitled
to refuse performance. Burton v. Adkins, 753.
15. CONTRACTS or Lirz IsuAxcCz, AS ATZZCTED BY THE LATE CIVIL
WAR, 651.
16. An act by one not sui jdris, which amounts only to a recognition of a
liability already imposed, will be sustained. Rector of the Charch of &. Bar-
tholomew v. Weod 187.
CONTRIBUTION. See BAwrKRTPTOT, 18.
CONVERSION.
1. By contract for sale of land the estate of the decedent is converted into
personalty, over which his personal representatives have absolute control. West
Hickory Mining Association v. Reed, 118.
2. When land is brought into a partnership as stock, it is, as between the
partners, their creditors and one who has knowingly dealt with them for it,
personalty belonging to the firm. Id., 119.
CORPORATION. See CONTRACT, 13; MUNIcIPaL CORPORATION; NATIONAL
.A written agreement to take a certain number of shares in an insurnce
company before its organization does not make the subscribers thereto stock-
holders, unless such proposal has been accepted by said company after Its
organization. Sarratt v. Rocland . re aud Marine Ins. Co., 55.
2. The return of the name of such a subscriber to the secretary of state,
as a stockholder, by the secretary of the compiny, under a mistake of fact,
and the entry of it upon the stock ledger, do not constitute an acceptance of
his proposal. Id.
3. The rule, that notice of facts to an agent is constructive notice thereof
to the principal, has no application to a case of a sale to a corporation, by
its president, of property purchased by him in his private capacity; in such
a transaction, the officer, in making the sale and conveyance, stands as a
stranger to the company. Barnes v. Trenton Gas-light Co., 117.
4. The Act of Congress (16 U. S. S. 98) under which certain corporations
are organized in the District of Columbia, contains a provision that "if the
indebtedness of any company organized under this act shall at any time
exceed the amount of its capital stock, the trustees of such company assenting
thereto shall be personally and individually liable for such excess to the cred-
itors of the company." Held, 1. That an action at law cannot be sustained
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by one creditor among many for the liability thus created, or for any part of
it, but that the remedy is in equity. 2. That this excess constitutes a fund
for the benefit of all the creditors, so far as the condition of the company
renders a resort to it necessary for the payment of their debts. Hornor v.
Henning, 117.
5. Where a statute provided that service upon a corporation should be upon
'C the president or any director or manager or other officer," an attorney is not
such officer. Northern Central Railroad Co. v. Rider, 695.
6. The charter of a church prohibited the corporation from disposing or
encumbering their real estate without the assent of the convention or standing
committee of the Episcopal Church of Pennsylvania; judgment was recov-
ered against the corporation. Held, that if duly authorized, legal formalities
in the execution might be waived. Rector v. Wood, 187.
7. The acknowledgment of a sheriff's deed raises the presumption that the
statutory requisites for notice to the parties have been complied with. Id.
8. The courts of Pennsylvania are bound by the decisions of the courts of a
sister state in relation to the organization of a corporation under the statutes
of that state. Grant v. Henry Clay Coal Co., 187.
9. A corporation of a sister state owning mining leases in Pennsylvania,
sold coal to the defendants in this state, through an agent here, known to them
to be such agent: Held, in a suit by the corporation for the price of the coal,
the defendants could not raise the question of the plaintiff's right to hold such
leases. The inquiry into such right could be made only by the Common-
wealth. Id.
10. A subscription to the stock of a public corporation prior to the procure-
ment of its charter, is absolute and a condition attached is void. Caley T. Phil-
adelphia and Chester Railroad Co., 188.
11. After a corporation is organized it may receive subscriptions for stock
on conditions which it is bound to perform. Id.
12. After organization, one subscribing without condiion cannot set up an
unlawful act of the directors to avoid his subscription. Id.
13. Whenever a power which the subscriber cannot control intervenes to
alter a material point in his contract without his assent, it works his release.
Id.
14. A subscription paper set out the termini of a railroad and the route
over which it would be constructed: Held, that this was an agreement that
the termini and the route should be as stated; and if the company materially
changed them, a subscriber would be released. Id.
15. When a new corporation is formed out of two or more previously ex-
isting corporations, and by the act creating it is "to have the powers, privi-
leges and immunities possessed by each of the corporations whose union con-
stitutes such new corporation," the new corporation will have the privileges,
powers and immunities which.they all (i. e., every one of them all) had, and
it will not have those special powers which some had and some did not haVe.
State v. Mdine Central Railroad Co., 249.
16. After the approval of an Act of Assembly incorporating a company,
conditional subscriptions to the capital stock of the company are valid. Ban-
over Junction Railroad Co. v. Haldeman, 251.
17. It may be shown by the acts and declarations of the party making a
conditional subscription that there has been a release or waiver of the condi-
tions. Id.
18. Directors, with borrowing powers, issued debentures at 7 per cent.
discount. Some of the debentures having been taken by a director, Held,
that the issue of debentures at a discount was not illegal, and that the director
was not liable to the company for the difference between 921 per cent. and
par. In re Campagnie generale de bellegarde : Campbell's Case, 310.
19. The defendant agreed to take shares in the plaintiff railroad company
agreeably to conditions that no work upon the road should be commenced
until the full amount was secured for its completion to Newport. The sub-
scriptions were less in amount than the actual cost; and, if a deduction be
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made of invalid conditional subscriptions, were much less than the cost esti-
mated by the engineer. Held, that the defendant's subscription was invalid.
Belfast 4- Moosehead Lake Railroad Co. v. Cottrell, 375.
20. After the grant of a charter providing that the capital should not exceed
2000 shares of $100 each, subscriptions were received as follows, "The sub-
scribers severally agree to and with the Warwick Railroad Company that we
will take the number of shaires of $100 each in the capital stock of said company,
set opposite our respective names under the provisions of its charter, and that
we will pay for the same in such manner as the board of directors may, under
the charter, direct." In an action by the corporation against i defaulting
subscriber : Held, that the contract was good, and the subscriber liable, not-
withstanding the whole capital was not subscribed for. Warwick Railroad Co.
v. Cady, 375.
21. The L. Railway Company was authorized by its acts of incorporation
to issue 190,000!. preference shares and a large amount of ordinary shares.
In 1864 it was amalgamated by Act of Parliament with the Cambrian Company,
up to which time it had issued 85,0001. preference shares, which ranked as
No. I preference stock, and 60,0001. ordinary shares, which jranked as No. 2
preference stock, and power was reserved to the Cambrian Company to raise
any capital which either of the amalgamated, companies had power to raise
prior to theamalgamatidn. The directors of the amalgamated company,
under a bowa fide belief that they were authorized to raise 15,000 additional
preference shares of the L. Company, and to make them rank with the 85,0001.
No. I preference stock, issued 15.000!. shares of preference stock, and described
them as No. I preference stock in the certificates, which were signed by the
directors and the secretary, and which were handed to the plaintiff at the time
he purchased some of the stock. It was subsequently decided that the new
stock was not No. I preference stock, but ranked below it. Held, that the
purchaser had not been deceived by any misrepresentation of fact, and his
bill was dismissed. Eaglemfield v. Marquis of Londonderry, 434.
22. A shareholder is estopped from denying existence of a corporation.
Casey v. Galli, 444.
23. A shareholder of a national bank-is liable, if called on, up to the par
value of his shares. Id.
24. A corporation may acquire a name by usage, as byretainingits original
name after a change thereof was authorized by an act of the legislature.
Alexander v. Berney, 570.
25. The assignee in bcnkruptcy of an insurance company may cause to be
set aside the cancellation of a mortgage belonging to such company, where
such cancellation was made under a resolution of the directors, obtained by
the fraud of the president for his benefit, and without consideration. Id.
26. But advances by a director, made to pay the debts of the company, and
secured by a mortgage upon the land so discharged, will be protected. Id.
27. An individual stockholder cannot maintain a separate action at'law
against the directors of a corporation for damages sustained by reason of the
negligence of the directors. Craig v. Gregg, 626.
28. A public corporation cannot be sued for the damages resulting from an
act which is ultra vires. Wheeler.v. Essex Public Road Board, 627.
29. A corporation was created by the legislature of Rhode Island under the
name of the W. Co. Nothing in the act of incorporation specified the busi-
ness to be done, nor did anything in the corporate name suggest it. All .its
stock was held by'a-single stockholder. The corporation entered into a part-
nership with A., to be terminated at will by the corporation. Veld, that the
partnership was not ultra vires on the part of the corporation. Allen v. Woon-
socket Co., 695.
CORPSE.
1. After the proper interment of a body the control over it rests with the
next of kin who is living. It cannot be transmitted or transferred. Lowry
v. Plitt, 155.
2. Where there were several next of kin in the same degree and they dif-
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fered in their wishes as to the disposition of the remains, a bill by the majority
to enjoin the others from interfering with the removal of the remains to
another place, was dismissed. Lowry v. Pitt, 155.
3. When a body has been properly buried in a vault, with the consent of
all concerned: qure whether even the next of kin can remove it against the
will of the vault-owner, though the latter be a stranger. Id.
COUNTY. See MUNICIPAL CORPORATION.
The general rule of law, that the employer must answer civilly for the
negligence of his servant, does not apply to counties. Symonds v. Clay
County, 55.
COURTS. See ERROR AsN APPEAL; RExOVAL OF CAss; UNITED STATES
COURTS.
1. Under the Bankrupt Act of 1867 the assignee might sue in the state
courts to recover the assets of the bankrupt, no exclusive jurisdiction being
given to the courts of the United States. Whether such exclusive jurisdiction
is given by the Revised Statutes, quaere. Clafiin r. louseman, 55.
2. Where exclusive jurisdiction to enforce the laws of the United States is
not given to the federal courts expressly or necessarily implied, the state courts
having competent jurisdiction in other respec;s may be resorted to. Id.
3. A court having regular terms hasno power to adjourn to a time after the
commencement of another regular term of the same court in the same county,
-where both terms are of the same character. Jaqupe v. Bridgeport Horse-Rail-
road Co., 657.
4. And it makes no difference that the adjournment is had for the purpose
of completing the trial of a single case already commenced, and that all the
other cases are continued. id.
5. Where a judge, by agreement of parties,.goes on with the hearing of a
case and renders judgment after the close of a term, the judgment is rendered
as of the term, and the agreement of the parties is the sole authority for the
proceeding. Id.
6. A civil term may be continued into or adjourned beyond a regular crim-
inal term of the same court in the same county, and vice versa. Id.
COVENANT.
1. An attachment resting upon land is an encumbrance upon it, within the
meaning of the covenant against encumbrances in a deed. Kelsey v. Rerer,
310.
2. A covenant that confers an immediate, permanent and beneficial effect on
the use to which real estate is designed to be applied, will run with the title.
National Union Bank v. Segur, 501.
3. Covenant by lessee "to pay the taxes of every name and kind that should
be assessed on the premises at any time during the said term," does not.cover
an assessment for benefits accruing from street improvements. Healsv. Prov-
idence Rubber Co., 696.
CRIINAL LAW. See ADMIRALTY, 12; INSANITY, I.
L Generlly.
1. Congress has power to provide that persons convicted of crimes against
the United States in one state may be imprisoned in another. Ex parte
Karstendieck, 118.
2. The fact that the prisoner had made in the 'court room an assault upon
a person, will not justify his being shackled three months thereafter when put
upon his trial. State v. .ring, 571.
3. Where a count was erroneously quashed, but the indictment still con-
tained a count on which a conviction for the offence charged in the quashed
count might have been had, the court refused to reverse for the error. State
v. Tnrock£morton, 234.
4. A defendant in an indictment has no right to be personally present at
the hearing of a motion in his behalf for a new trial : and his absence,
though in jail, will not invalidate a sentence subsequently passed upon him
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when he is present. Commonwealtiiv. Costello, 734. See ERRoR AND Ap-
PEAL, 3.
5. The court will not hear or determine such a motion if the defendant is
not within its control ; not because he is entitled to be present, but because the
court will not hear him unless he is there to abide by the decision. .2d.
6. At common law it was illegal to compound a misdemeanor as well as a
felony. In Massachusetts a statute having provided when the prosecution of
a misdemeanor may be compromised by leave of court, a compromise in such
a prosecution is illegal unless such consent of court appears. Partridge v.
Hood, 267.
7. Where a sentence not authorized by law has been imposed upon a pris-
oner a court of error can only reverse the judgment. McDonald V. State,
696.
8. Venires to the grand jury must be sealed, and a defective venire cannot
be cured by subsequent legislation. The Sate v. Flenmning, 248.
9. A defendant in a criminal case who is made a competent witness by
statute, may testify to his intent in doing the act charged as a crime. White
y. State, 751.
10. In a criminal prosecution, where the defendant seeks to justify on the
ground of self-defence, it is not competent to give in evidence the opinion of
a witness as to the existence of danger to life. Sate of Ohio v. Rhoads, 629.
11. MICROSCOPICAL ExAMINATION Or BLoOD IN ITS RELATION TO CRIM-
INAL TRIALS, 257.
IL Assault and Battery. See post 19.
12. Where one commences an altercation with another, and strikes his
adversary with his hand, with no purpose or design to kill or cause great
bodily injury to him, and his adversary repels such assault with a deadly
weapon, and after the assailed has shot and wounded the assailant, and has
retired behind a wall and the assailant ceases to follow, but has neither re-
treated nor attempted any abandonment of the conflict : Held, that the assail-
ant is not justified in defending his own life to the taking the life of the other,
even if the assailed attempts at the time to shoot the assailant. Sate Y.
Bogers, 375.
MII. Embezzlement.
13. A clerk who received checks which it was his sluty to hand over to the
cashier, passed them to third persons from whom he-rqceived the amounts in
money. He then handed the money to the cashier as a return of an over-
draft of his salary. Held, rightly convicted of embezzlement. Queen v. Gale,
310.:
IV. False Pretence.
14. The prisoner being charged with obtaining, by false pretences, the
moneys of a company: held, that the existence of the company was suffl-
ciently proved by evidence, that it had carried on business as such. The
Queen v. Langton, 628.
15. CRIMINAL FALSe PRE*ZNOES, WxrAT ARE? 321.
16. The appellant was convicted under 5 Geo. IV., which makes punish-
able as a rogue and vagabond "every person * * * using any subtle craft,
means or device by palmistry or otherwise, to deceive and impose on-any of his
majesty's subjects." In a case stated it was found that the appellant
attempted to deceive and impose upon certain persons by falsely pretending to
have the supernatural faculty of obtaining from invisible agents and the spirits
of the dead, answers, messages and manifestations of power, namely, noises,
raps and the winding up of a musical-box : Held, that the conviction was right.
Monack v. Hiltoa, 502.
V. Larceny.
17. When a person finds lost goods and takes possession with intent to
appropriate them, beliering or having ground to believe that the owner can
be found, it is larceny. Baker v. State, 502.




receiving from her the goods which she has taken from her husband, cannot
be guilty of receiving stolen goods. The Queen v. Kenny, 627.
VI. Manslaughter.
19. There may be an unlawful intention to kill and yet the killing be only
manslaughter, if it be without malice, as, e. g., upon sudden heat or quarrel.
Therefore, an indictment for assault and battery with intent to commit man-
.slaughter, is good. tate of Indiana v. Throckmorton, 234.
20. Where death is caused by the use of a deadly weapon., and the circum-
stances of the killing are detailed to the jury, some of which tend to disprove
a malicious or intentional killing, it is misleading to charge the jury "that
in this case the law raises a presumption of malice in the defendant, and an
intent on his part to kill the deceased. Erwin v. State, 501.
21. Intent to kill may be present in manslaughter. Id.
VII. Murder.
22. In an indictment for murder, it was error in the court to instruct the
jury that they must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the prisoner was
insane at the time the act was committed. Meyers v. Commonwealth, 627.
23. It is murder in the first degree, where the evidence shows that the pris-
oner had had time to act deliberately, and had not acted under a sudden gust
of passion, and had been on very bad terms with the deceased. Green v.
Comnonwealth, 627.
CURTESY. See HUSBAND AND WxFE, II.
CUSTOM. See EASEMENT, 3.
DAMAGES. See CoMMoN CARtRIER, 5.
1. The measure of damages for a continuing nuisance or a continuing tres-
pass, is the loss sustained at the date of the plaintiff's writ, and not the dimi-
nution in the value of the estate. Cumberland, itc., Canal Co. v. Hitchings, 56.
2. Where punitive damages are recoverable evidence of defendants' pecu-
niary condition is admissible. Hayner v. Cowden, 106.
3. In assessing damages in an action for the breach of a promise of marriage,
the jury cannot consider the consequences to plaintiff had she married defend-
ant and thereby formed an unhappy alliance. Piper v. Kingsbury, 118.
4. After a wrong has been committed it is the duty of the injured party to
make reasonable efforts to prevent an increase or extension of the injury, and
if he fails to do so he cannot recover for such increased injury. K. P. Rail-
way Co. v. Miman, 383.
5. It is the duty of the party injured to avoid the consequences of such
wrong, as far as he reasonably can. If, by labor, or a reasonable outlay of
money, he can stay or avoid the consequences of the wrong, he should do so.
All consequences resulting from his own wilful failure or gross negligence to
use timely and reasonable precaution to prevent an extension or increase of
the injury, should fall upon himself. Lawson v. Price, 760.
6. More than compensation for damages actually sustained can never be
awarded against the United States. United States v. Smith, 443.
7. In an action by a passenger against a railroad company for being wrong-
fully ejected from the cars by the conductor, it appeared that the rates of fare
fixed by the company, and which by its established rules it was made the duty
of the conductor to demand, were higher than those allowed by law. The
plaintifftendered the legal rates, and upon refusal to pay more, was ejected
from the cars, but without any rudeness or unnecessary violence. The
plaintiff, at the time he took passage, knew the established rates, and expected
to be ejected from the cars, intending to bring an action for such ejection, in
order to test the right of the company to charge the established rates. Held,
that the plaintiff was only entitled to compensatory damages, and that it was
competent for the company to give in evidence subsequent- declarations of the
plaintiff, tending to prove that his object in taking passage on the cars was to /
make money, by bringing suits against the company for demanding or receiving
their established rates of fare. C. H. 6- D. Railroad Co. v. Cole, 502.
DAY. See TuE.
INDEX. 779
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR. See AccomUT; APPLICATION OF PAYMENTS;
EQUITY, 3, 14; HUSBAND AND WIFE, 11, 14-18.
1. A voluntary conveyance, though without a fraudulent intent, is void as
against creditors under the statute 13 Elizabeth. Logan v. Brick, 696.
2. A creditor having the security of two funds out of which he can satisfy
his debt, upon one of which only another creditor has a junior lien, will be
compelled in equity to resort first to the fund which the junior creditor can-
not reach. Id.
3. A debtor of wife has no interest in an afite-nuptial contract entitling him
to set it-up in equity. Hill v. Garman et ux., 754.
4. B. & S. were holders of a note of J. M., endorsed by A. M. Both T.
M. and A. M. at different times made assignments for the benefit of their
respective creditors. B. & S. received a dividend on the note from the estate
of J. M. Held, that they were entitled, in the subsequent distribution of the
estate of A. M., to a dividend upon the amount of the whole note. Miller's
Estate. Bair 4- Shenk's Appeal, 252.
5. A debtor in failing circumstances gave his bond to one creditor to secure
a debt due to such creditor, and as to the balance under a parol trust to pay
certain other creditors, per schedule. Hid, void as to the other creditors.
Condy v. Waters et al., 252.
6. Such a transaction does not create a trust in favor of the creditors.
The bond is revocable at the will of the oblikor ; and it is prohibited by the
Statute of Frauds. Id.
7. A bond given by a debtor in failing circumstances covering all his pro-
perty for the benefit of preferred creditors, is contrary to the policy of the
statute against fraudulent insolvency. Id.
DECEIT. See CoRPoRATiON. 21.
DEED. See ESTOPPEL, 1 ; HUSBAND AND WIFE, 23; INFANT, 3.
1. It is true that, as a general rule, monuments, natural or artificial,
referred to in a deed, control, on its construction, rather than courses and dis-
tances ; but this rule is not inflexible, and must yield where the whole circum-
stances show that it ought not to be applied. White v. Lanning, 252.
2. If a party having the equitable title to land conveys the same by a qnit-
claim deed, and subsequently acquires the legal right, it will enure to his
grantee. Welsh v. Dutton, 311.
3. When there is a-manifest clerical error, the counterpart may be looked
to, to ascertain the mistake. Burchell v. Clark, 311.
4. Extrinsic testimony is admissible to identify land conveyed by the follow-
ing description, to wit : "A tract or lot of land known as the east half of the
southwest division of section 17," although such testimony shows that the land
so conveyed is less in quantity than the mathematical half of the division.
"liefv. Hart, 502. •
DEMURRAGE. See SHIIPPING, 4-8.
DESERTION. See HUSBAND AND WIFE, 8, 9.
DISTRESS. See LANDLORD AND2 TENANT, 1, 2.
DIVORCE. See HUSBAND AND WIFE, I.
DOMICILE.
The domicile of a party in any particular locality is acquired by a union
of intent and of presence. nhabitants of Stockton v. Staples, 376.
DONATIO MORTIS CAUSA. See HUSBAND AND WIFE, 14.
DOWER. See HUSBAND AND WIFE, II.
EASEMENT.
I. Of natural right the surface land is entitled to support from the strata
below. Coleman v. Chadwick, 119.
2. When the owner of the whole fee grants the minerals, reserving the
surface, his grantee is entitled only to so much of the minerals as he can get
without injury to the surface. Id.
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3. A custom contrary to such right would not be reasonable, and therefore
would be invalid. Coleman v. Chadwick, 119.
4. A grant of minerals and all privileges necessary for the convenient
working, &c., of coal, and the rights "incident or usually appurtenant to
working and using coal mines," does not affect the grantor's right to a sur-
face support. . Id.
5. The loss of springs to the owner of the surface by reason of the ordi-
nary working of the mines, does not render the owner of the minerals liable
for damages. Id.
ELECTIONS. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 31-33.
I. It is the duty of a town-clerk to record the votes as publicly declared
by the moderator of a town meeting. His duty is purely ministerial. Hill
v. Goodwin, 248.
2. A writ of mandamus will issue to compel him to do so. Id.
EMBEZZLEMENT. See CRIMINAL LAw, 13.
EMINENT DOMAIN. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, lIL
ENCUMBRANCE. See COVENANT, 1.
EQUITY. See CHARITABLE USES, 3; CORPOn&TIoN. 21; DEBTOR AND CUED-
ITOR, 2 ; EVIDENCE, 2 ; LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF, 2 ; MORTGAGE, 10.
1. Equity abhors a forfeiture when it works a loss that is contrary to equity,
not when it works equity and protects the lessor against the laches of the
lessee. Brown v. Vandegrffl, 56.
2. A mistake of fact to warrant a court of equity in granting relief must be
material, and such as controlled the action of the party. Grymes v. Sanders,
57.
3. It is no ground for relief in equity that the debtor in a judgment is de-
ceased and that there is no personal representative of his estate. The creditor
has sufficient remedy at law by raising an administration.. Cochran v. Coch-
ran, 188. See post 19.
4. Where the board of directors of a corporation, in issuing new stock to
the shareholders generally, refuse to issue to a particular stockholder his due
proportion thereof, he may compel its issue to him by suit in equity against
the corporation (at least as long as there is sufficient stock remaining undis-
posed of) ; though he might probably have maintained an action at law against
it for damages. Dousman v. Wis. 6- Lake Sup. M. and S. Co., 188.
5. If there are other shareholders in like condition with the plaintiff their
right and his are several, and he has no right to represent them. 7d.
6. What causes of action may be properly joined in a bill and what cannot
is a question addressed to the sound discretion of the court. Ferry v. Laible,
120.
7. Where it appears that the causes of action or claims are so dissimilar
or distinct in their nature that they cannot be heard and determined together,
a clear case of misjoinder is presented. Id.
8. But where a complainant has two g6od causes of action, each furnishing
the foundation of a separate suit growing out of the same subject-matter where
all the defendants have some interest on every question raised on the record,
they may be properly joined, and the objection of multifariousness or mis-
joinder will not be sustained. Id.
9. Equity will relieve a party against a judgment at law when its justice
can be impeached by facts or on grounds of which the party seeking its aid
could not have availed himself at law. Cairo 4- Fulton Railroad Co. v. Titus
J- Scudder, 120.
10. The Court of Chancery exercises concurrent jurisdiction with courts of
law, in cases where, though the rights are purely legal, other and more efficient
aid is required than a court of law can afford. Hoppock's Ex'rs v. United
ZVeo Jersey Railroad and Canal Co., 120.
11. The Court of Chancery will take jurisdiction of a suit properly cognisable




12. A decree cannot be made against a woman who Is both a minor and
feme covert, without appointing a guardian ad litem. O'Hara and Wife v.
MacConnel J- Kennedy, 121.
13. To divest a feme covert or minor of an interest in real estate, the title
of which is in a trustee for her use, the trust being an active one, the trustee
must be a party to the suit. Id.
14. Equity will recognise a lien which has a legal precedence, but not a
preference arising from mere diligence. Thus where the senior judgment
creditor files a bill and has a conveyance by his debtor set aside for fraud,
equity will not give him a preference, but distribute among creditors pari
passu. Newell v. Morgan, 188.
15. A chancellor will order an issue for trial by jury only respecting a fact
which is material. Conly v. Waters, 252.
16. A bill against one charging him as executor for payment of a legacy
will not authorize a decree against him personally, as devisee of land charged
with the legacy. Cloud v. Vhiteman, 253.
17. The prayer for general relief does not sustain such a decree. Id.
18. The charter of a bridge company provided that any excess of tolls over
ten per cent. of its capital stock should be paid to the trustee of the school
fund, who was authorized to sue for the same at law. Held, that, notwith-
standing the remedy at law, a bill in equity would lie in the name of the state
against the company for a discovery, account and payment. State v. Wilmin-
ton Bridge Co., 253.
19. Before a judgment creditor can resort to a court of equity to aid in the
collection of an execution, he must show that all legal remedies have been
exhausted. Howe v. Whitney, 311. See ante 3.
20. Where a party has a plain, adequate and complete remedy at law,
equity will not lie. Spofford v. Bangor and Bucksport Railroad Co., 312.
21. A common rumor that an injunction has been dissolved will not excuse
the breach of it. Morris, Adm'r, v. Hill, 571.
22. Presumptions do not always proceed on the belief that the thing pre-
sumed has actually taken place. Downs v. S, og, 571.
23. A mortgagor who comes into equity for relief against a mortgage on
which no payment nor claim of any kind has been mnde for thirty years, is
entitled to the benefit of the presumption of payment. Td.
24. Equity will, in some cases, decree the performance of a general cov-
enant of indemnity upon the principle on which the court entertains bills
quia timet. Reynolds v. Herdmann, 696.
25. Where the loss or destruction of negotiable securities has happened
without the fault of the party applying, equity will grant relief, provided such
relief can be given without derogating from any positive agreement or vio-
lating equity in other parties. Chesapeake J- Ohio Canal Co. v. Blair, 754.
26. Secure indemnity, however, must be given the defendant against all
risk. Id.
27. In equity the answer must be negatived by more than one witness.
Seitz v. Mitchell, 502.
ERROR AND APPEAL. See JuDGmExT, 2.
1. Where parties below are not made parties to an appeal, a reversal can-
not be asked on any matter which will injuriously affect their interests. Terry
v. Merchants' and Planters' Bank, 57.
2. An order striking out an answer when followed by judgment is appeal-
able. Fuller 4. McKibben v. Claffin, 121.
5. The court can refuse to hear a criminal ase in error, unless the convicted
party suing out the writ is within the jurisdiction of the court. Smith v. United
dtates, 189.
4. In the Supreme Court of the United States the service of a writ of error
or the perfection of an appeal within sixty days, Sundays exclusive, after the
rendering of the judgment or the passing of the decree complained of, is an
indispensable pre-requisite to a supersedeas. Kitchen -v. Randolph, 189.
5. On suing out a writ of error, if after the security has been accepted the
circumstances of the case have changed, so that security which at the time it
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was taken was good and sufficient does not continue to be so, the court may so
adjudge and order as justice may require. But upon facts existing at the time
the security was accepted, the action of the justice within the statute and rules
of practice adopted for his guidance is final. Martin v. Hazard Povder Co.,
189.
6. It was not the intention of Congress, under the Act of 1789, to interfere
at all with the practice of the state courts as to executions upon their judg-
ments until a supersedeas was actually perfected. Doyle v. Wisconsin, 376.
7. If an execution is issued upon a judgment in the courts of the United
States after the expiration of ten days, a supersedeas afterwards obtained will
prevent further proceedings under the execution, but will not interfere with
what has already been done. Id.
8. When on a peremptory mandamus from a state court, the secretary of
state of Wisconsin revoked the license of a foreign insurance company within
ten days, a writ of error perfected afterwakds will not interfere with what had
already been done under the state writ. id.
9. The Circuit Court can he compelled by writ of mandamus to allow an
appeal which is of right under sect. 692 of Rev. St. Ex parte Jordan et al.
503.
10. A writ of mandamus cannot perform the offices of a writ of error. Ex
parte Loring, 503.
11. The Supreme Court of the United States has only such appellate juris-
diction as has been conferred by Congress, and can proceed only in the man-
ner which the law prescribes. United States v. Young, 503.
12. In that court a certiorari is allowed only as auxiliary process to enable
'the court to obtain further information in respect to matters already before it
for adjudication. Id.
13. Appeals do not lie to the Supreme Court from the decisions of the
Circuit Courts in the exercise of their supervisory jurisdiction under the bank-
rupt law. Conro v. Crane, 503. See BANKRUPTCY, 1.
14. Where a decree is entered directing a receiver for a railroad company
to pay money into "court, although not P party to the foreclosure suit under
which the money was realized, he is such a party in interest as to be entitled
to an appeal. Hinclay v. Railroad, 503.
ESTOPPEL. See CoRPoRATION, 22; JUDGMENT, 13; LANDLORD AND TENANT,
11.
1. The acknowledgment by the grantor of the receipt of the consideration
of a deed is not a conclusive.estoppel that it has been so received. Barter v.
Greenleaf, 56.
2. For equitable estoppel, there must generally be some intended deception
in the conduct or declarations of the party to be estopped, or such gross negli-
gence on his part as to amount to constructive fraud, by which another has
been misled to his injury. Brant v. Virginia Coal Co., 403.
3. Where the estoppel relates to the title of real property, it is essential
that the party claiming to have been influenced by the conduct or declarations
of another was himself not only destitute of knowledge of the true state of the
title, but also of any convenient and available means of acquiring such know-
ledge. Id.
4. In an action against a county upon certain interest coupons originally
attached to bonds issued by the county for the erection of a court-house, it was
found and determined that the bonds were void as against the county in the
hands of parties who did not acquire them before maturity for value; and,
inasmuch as the plaintiff in that action had not proved that he bad givdn such
value, it was adjudged that he was not entitled to recover: Held, that the
judgment did not estop the plaintiff holding other bonds of the same series,
and other coupons attached to the sftme bonds as the coupons in the original
action, from showing in a second action against the county that he acquired
such other bonas and coupons for value before maturity. Crowell v. County
of&c, 721.
5. Estoppels by judgment in a second action for the same demand and in
other actions on different demand, discussed. Id., note.
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EVIDENCE. See BILLS AID NOTES, 7; DAxAGES, 7 ; HUSBAND AND WIFE,
3-6.
I. Generally.
1. The copy of a statute of another state, certified by the secretary of state
under its seal, is properly certified, according to the Act of Congress of May
26th 1790, and is admissible fi evidence. Grant v. Henry OMay Coal Co., 189.
2. In equity practice, where the evidence has been closed, it will not ordi-
narily be opened for newly-discovered testimony merely.cumulative ; but this
rule is not imperative; it will be enforced subject to the discretion of the
court. Mulock v. Mulock, 287.
3. Where the newly-discovered testimony is cumulative in character, but
makes plain and certain what was doubtful before, so that the court can'see
that it may be material to a just decision of the cause, and there has been no
laches in the party offering it, it will be admitted. Id.
4. Evidence is not to be deemed cumulative which is different in kind and
character from what went before, such as admissions as distinguished from
adverse testimony. Id.
5. Judges are no longer required to submit a case to the jury merely be-
cause some evidence has been introduced by the party having the burden of
proof, unless the e&idence be of such a character that it would warrant the
jury in finding a verdict. County Commissioners v. Clark, 377.
6. Extrinsic evidence is' not admissible to contradict, add to or vary a
written instrument. Thus evidence is not admissible to prove that the name
Rufus V., in a deed, was intended for Russell V. Pits v. Brown, 754.
1. Declarations and Admisions. See AENT.
7. A party cannot be compelled to accept his adversary's admission in lieu
of affirmative evidence offered by himself. Ins. Co. v. Moore, 214.
8. Where a paper is admissible for one purpose, it does not become inad-
missible because it cannot be used for another. Thus where an administrator
sues on a life insurance policy, his letters of administration are admissible in
proof of his representative character, although they are not in such case evi-
dence of the death of the insured. Id.
9. Though there is no presumption of death from the fact of disappearance
until after seven years, yet a jury may infer death at an earlier date, from
circumstances or any other satisfactory evidence. Id.
10. A clause in a policy of life insurance that the policy shall be void if
the assured die by his own hand, is in the nature of a penalty or forfeiture,
and the burden is on the insurers to show that it has been incurred. Id.
11. Such forfeiture is not incurred by self-desiruction while insane, and it
makes no difference whether the language of the policy is "die by his own
hand" or by "suicide." The terms are synonymous. Id.. 12. Where the jury find the fact of the death of the assured, bet in answer
to special instructions to find whether or not he committed suicide, they return
that they cannot say, this does not vitiate the verdict. A general verdict for
the plaintiff would not be vitiated even by a finding that the assured committed
suicide, unless the jury also find that it was voluntary. Id.
13. The declarations of an agent made at the time of the particular trans-
action, while acting within the scope of his duties, may be given in evidence
against his principal, but his subsequent declarations cannot. Huntingdon and
Broad Top Mountain Railroad Co. v. Decker, 253. See AGENT, 1.
14. The declarationsof officers of a corporation rest upon the same prin-
ciples as apply to other agents. Id.
15. The death of the agent through whom a contract has been-effected
does not exclude the testimony of the party dealing with him in an action
against his principal. The Anerican Lfe Ins. and Trust Co. v. Schultz, 253.
16. In an action against a life insurance company for the violation of an
alleged contract to give "a paid up policy'lafter the third payment upon a
life policy not expressed in the policy, eitence .of the powers of the agents
generally is inadmissible. Id.
17. Declarations mAde by the holder of a chattel or promissory note,
while he held it, are not competent evidence in a suit upon it by a subsequent
owner. Dodge v. .&eednah's S. and T. Co., 312.
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18. The statute with regard to the execution of wills provided that all wills
should be attested ", by three witnesses, all of them subscribing in the presence
of the testator." Held, not to be necessary that the witnesses should also have
subscribed in the presence of each other. Galilor's Appeal, 312.
EXCHANGE. See BROKER; CONTRACT, 14."
EXECUTION. See ATTACHMENT.
EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS. See CoRPsE; EQUITY, 16.
1. In an action of debt against an executor, founded on a judgment against
his testator in his lifetime, where there is a plea of plene administravit and no
averment of devastavit in the narr., the judgment should be de bonis testatoris,
and a judgment de bonis propriis will be reversed. Smith v. ChTapman, 57.
2. Where the jury find against an executor on a plea of plene administravit,
they must find the amount of assets in his hands before judgment can be en-
tered against him. Id.
3. An administrator succeeding an executor takes only the powers inherent
in the executor's office. Special powers given the executor do not go to such
an administrator, unless the will continues them to such administrator.
Belcher v. Branch, 696.
EXPRESS COMPANY. See CoroN CARRIER, 1.
FALSE PRETENCES. See CRIxnAL LAw, IV.
FERRY.
The owner of a ferry cannot maintain an action for loss of traffic caused by
a new highway or bridge made to provide for a new traffic. Hopkins v. Great
N. Railroad Co., 504.
FOREIGN CORPORATION. See INsun&cE, I.
FOREIGN JUDGMENT.
1. A judgment rendered in another state, when sued on here can be im-
peached only on the ground that the adjudging court did not have jurisdiction
over the person of defendant or the subject-matter. Jardine v. Beichart, 504.
2. A judgment in another state embracing the same matter is conclusive,
although the suit in which the judgment has been obtained was begun after
the one to which the judgment is pleaded in bar, and although in the former
the matter was put in issue only as a set-off. Paine v. Schenectady Ins. Co.,
564.
3. A judgment under such circumstances is well pleaded puis darrein con-
tinuance, and where such plea sets forth that the judgment was obtained by the
receiver of the present defendant, a corporation, and that the suit was between
the same parties, it will be inferred that for the purposes of such suit the
receiver and the corporation were legally identical. Id.
4. A claim that the judgment set up in the plea has been appealed from,
will not be regarded unless it is properly averred in the pleadings. Id.
FORFEITURE. See EQUITY, 1; EVIDENCE, 10, 11.
FORMER ADJUDICATION. See FOREIGNe JUDGMENT, 2.
1. A final decree, entered upon the record and signed by the chancellor,
dismissing the bill, and not directed to be without prejudice, is a bar to another
bill filed between the same parties for the same subject-matter. Cochran v.
Couper, Adm., 189.
2. The complainant, a married woman, had filed a previous bill in equity
for arrearages of an annuity, claiming to recover suijuris on the ground of a
divorce. The bill was dismissed for want of proof of the divorce. Hedd, that
the decree, not being withou prejudice, was a bar to the present bill filed
against the same defendant for the same subject-matter. Id.3. The omission of endbrsers on a series of notes, transferred to the holder
in settlement of their own note held by him, upon an agreement in writing
that they should not be held liable on their endorsement, to set up the agree-
ment as a defence to an action against them, brought by the holder on two
INDE.X.
FORMER ADJUDICATION.
of the notes, does not preclude them from setting up the agreement in a second
action by the holder on others of the same series of notes. The judgment in
the original action does not operate as an estoppel against showing the exist-
ence and validity of the agreement in the second action. Davis v. Brown, 476.'
4. When a judgment in one action is offered in evideide in a subsequent
action between the same parties upon a different demand, it operates as an
estoppel only upon the matter actually at issue and determined in the original
action ; and such matter, when not disclosed by the pleadings, must be shown
by extrinsic evidence. Id.
5. In trespass for assault and battery a recovery by defendant against plain-
tiff for the identical assault and battery declared upon is no bar to the action.
Cede v. .MfcFarland, 57.
6. A party called upon to make good his cause of action or establish his
defence, must do so by all the proper means within his control, and if he fails
in that respect, purposely or negligently, he will not afterwards be permitted
to re-litigate the same matters. The Covinyton 4- Cincinnati Bridge Co. v.
Sargent, 121.
7. An award being made, a bill was filed by the party who was to pay for
correction of the account, and a credit was decreed him. In a subsequent
action on a note given in pursuance of the award, the decree in equity was
held conclusive on the validity of the award. Beam v. Macomber, 498.
8. S. had sold to D. several lots of staves, all at a price fixed by a contract,
whereby S. was to deliver and D. to accept all the staves to be got out by S.
in 1863. After all the staves had been delivered, S. sued D. upon the con-
tract and the case went to judgment. During the trial S. failed, by reason
of the absence or drunkenness of a witness, to prove an item of 2546 staves,
and that item he withdrew from the jury. He afterward sued D. to recover
for the item thus withdrawn: Held, that the former judgment was a final
determination of the damages to which S. was entitled under the contract.
Dutton v. Shaw, 444.
FRAUD. See BILLs AND NOTES, 13; CORPORATION, 25 ; MORTGAGE, 7.
To constitute representations fraudulent so as to be a ground for the rescis-
sion of a contract, they must be both false and fraudulent. If they are made
with an honest belief, at the time, of their truth, they are not fraudulent.
Parmalee, Adm'r, v. Adolph, 572.
FRAUDS, STATUTE OF. See DEBTOR AND CREDITOR, 6; HUSBAND AND
WIFE, 20-22.
1. In addition to fall payment of the purchase-money, possession must also
be taken of the property, to take a verbal agreement to convey real estate out
of the Statute of Frauds. Temple v. Johnson, 57.
2. If A. pays a debt to B. by delivering him the note of C., and orally
guarantees the payment thereof, such guaranty is void under the Statute of
Frauds-his own original debt being thereby discharged. Dow v. Swett, 471.
3 Verbal contract for future purchase is not saved by a telegram complet-
ing it, but which does not in itself contain the substantial elements of in
agreement. McElroy v. Buck, 504.
4. An agreement between the owner of ait artificial watercourse and a rail-
road company, that the latter may divert the water into a new channel on its
own land, in consideration that the. railroad company will open the old
channel and restore the water thereto whenever requested, is not within the
statute. Hamilton and Rossville Hydraulic Co. v. Cincinnati, H. and D. Railroad
Co., 512.
5. A mere promise to pay the debt of a third persons, without any new or
superadded consideration moving to the promisor from the plaintiff, is within
the Statute of Frauds ; but it is not necessary to allege in the declaration
that the promise is in writing ; it is sufficient if that appear in proof at the
trial. Ecker v. Bohn, 693.
6. A promise to pay the debt of a third person, in consideration that his
creditor would abstain from instituting proceedings to have him declared a




7. Wild grass growing on wild, unoccupied, uncultivated land, is a part
of the realty, and an attempted transfer of such grass by parol agreement is
void, as a conveyance of tie grass, under the Statute of Frauds. 1'olrfrs v.
Clarkson, 382.
8. To take a parol gift or sale of land between father and son out of the
operation of the Statute of Frauds, the evidence thereof must be direct, express
and unambiguous. Shellhamer et ed. v. Ashbetpuh, 629.
9. A verbal promise by one person to the creditor of an execution on a
judgment against a third person, that if such creditor will satibry execution,
such promisor will deliver certain personal property, and pay a sum of money
to such creditor, is not a promise to pay the debt of another, and is not within
the Statute of Frauds. Palmer v. Blain, 697.
10. STUeES IN TIE LAW OF THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS, 577, 641.
GIFT.
A woman deposited $460 in a savings bank for E. K., her niece, the de-
posit being placed to the credit on the books of the bank of 11 E. M.-3. K.,
guardian ;" she at the same time informing M. K., the guardian, that she had
put the money in the bank for E. K. A bank book was delivered to her by
the bank with the deposit so entered upon it, but she retained possession of it,
and afterwards had the money transferred back to her hy the guardian. Th
court below found that at the time the deposit was made she intenled it as a
gift to E. K. Held, to be a complete gift and beyond her power of revocation.
Kerrigan v. .Rautigan, 313.
GOVERNMENT. See UNITED STATES.
GUARANTY. See TRUST, 2.
In an action against a guarantor it is essential to prove a state of facts
which establishes inability to collect of the principal debtors, one and all ;
and such inability may be proved by showing a prosecution to final judgment
and execution, without avail. Aldrich v. Chubb, 630.
GUARDIAN AND WARD.
1. Profit derived from land purchased by a guardian with the ward's money
shall go for the benefit of the ward. Kepler v. Davis, 57.
2. A guardian may settle with his ward, and if the settlement be fair, it is
sufficient and satisfies the bond. Davenport v. Ohnstead, 313.
HABEAS CORPUS.
1. Where an inferior court has jurisdiction of the cause and the person in
a criminal suit, and no writ of error lies to the Supreme Court, the latter will
not review the legality of the proceedings on habeas corpus. Er parle P'arks,
84.
2. It is only where the proceedings below are entirely void, either for want
of jurisdiction or other cause, that such relief will be given. Id.
3. Whether a matter for which a defendant is indicted in the District Court
is or is not a crime by the laws of the United States, is a question which that
court must decide, and is within its jurisdiction. The Supreme Court will
not review its decision by habcas corpus. Id.
HIGHWAY. See MUNIC11AL CORPORATION, 2, 5; NUISANCE.
1. In the absence of anything in his deed to show a contrary intention, the
grantee of a lot in a recorded plat takes to the centre of adjoining public
ways, subject to the public easement ; and this result is not affected by the
fact that the description in the deed as well as the plat gives the dimensions
of the lot as it is, exclusive of the highway. Pettibone v. 1familton, 190.
2. This doctrine applies in favor of one who took a deed, by metes and
bounds only, of land which afterwards constituted a distinct lot upon a plat
subsequently made and recorded by his grantor. Id.
3. It is now not essential to a highway that it be a thoroughfare from town
to town. The State v. Bishop, 505.
4. Proceedings by-a state for the protection of public interests do not need
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a private relator. Vanatta, Attorney- General, v. The Delaware and Bound
Brook Railroad Co., 246.
HOMESTEAD.
I. A mortgage of premises, no part of which constitutes the homestead at
the time of the mortgage, although not executed by the wife, is not affected
by the subsequent selection of the premises mortgaged, as the homestead of
the mortgagor. Gibson v. 3fundell, 505.
2. A. and wife executed a mortgage to G. on their homestead and other
real estate. Subsequently D. obtained a judgment against A. After A.'s
death his wife and children continued to occupy the homestead. G. foreclosed
his mortgage, and in the decree with his consent it was ordered that the real
estate other than the homestead be first sold. L., who was a party to the
foreclosure proceedings, objected and insisted that the homestead be first sold:
Hild, that there was no error. La Rue v. Gilbert, 572.
HUSBAND AND WIFE. See EQUITY, 12, 13 ; INSURANCE, 9 ; INTOXICATING
LIQUORS, 2.
I. Afaurriagc and Dirorce. See CONFLICT OF LAWS, 6; INFANT, 5; JUDG-
MENT, 4.
1. DIVORCES, FOREIGN INCLUDING THOSE OBTAINED IN A DIFFERENT
STATE OF THE UNION, 65, 193.
2. Clear evidence is required to show fraud upon the court in obtaining
jurisdiction, before a decree of divorce can be annulled. Lord v. Lord, 447.
3. In a case involving the question of marriage, where the connection
between the parties was illicit in its commencement, it will be presumed to
continue to be of the same character ; and in order to overcome that presump-
tion it will be necessary to adduce other evidence than that of the cohabitation
of the parties to establish their marriage. Jones et al. v. Jones, 698.
4. The presumption of marriage will not arise from the cohabitation of a
man with a woman, if, during her life and without any proof of a divorce, he
marries another woman. 1d.
5. On questions of marriage, births, deaths, &c., entries in a family Bible
or Testament are admissible. Id.
6. Proof of the handwriting or authorship of the entries is not required,
when the book is shown to have been the family Bible or Testament. Id.
7. On the husband's appeal from a judgment of divorce in favor of the
wife, it appearing that the respondent married again before the time for appeal
from the judgment had expired, and that her second husband was still living,
her motion for an order on the appellant to pay her a sum sufficient to enable
her to litigate the appeal was denied. Coad v. Coad, 190.
8. Desertion, in the marriage relation, consists in the breaking off of cohab.
itation with a determination not to renew it. Bennett v. Bennett, 314.
9. A separation resulting from necessity, as from the inability of the hus-
band to provide for the support of his wife, does not constitute desertion. Id.
10. Where, in a suit for a divorce, a wife asked for the custody of two
daughters of the marriage, aged five and nine years, and it was found that
the husband was of good moral character and attached to the children, but.
from business incapacity and failure to find employment was unable to sup-
port them, but that his mother and sister, who had abundant means and were
of the best character, were willing to assume the expense of their support
and education, it was held that it was not a case where the court ought to give
the custody of the children to the wife on the ground of the unfitness of the
husband for their custody. Id.
II. Curtesy and Dower.
11. Tenancy by the curtesy initiate, is not subject to attachment in Rhode
Island for the husband's debts. Greenwich National Bank v. Hall, 376.
12. A general pecuniary bequest in lieu of dower is not subject to abate-
ment pro rata with the other pecuniary bequests in case of insufficient assets.
Potter v. Brown, 378.
13. It is a fair presumption that parties purchasing lands subject to dower,
where the wife does not join in the conveyance, do not pay as much for the
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same as they would for a clear title, and that they voluntarily take the chances
of her surviving her husband. 11Vestbrook v. Vanderburgh, 444.
fI. Separate Estate. See BANKRUPTCY, 17. DEBTOR AND CREDITOR, 3;
MORTGAGE, 7 ; TRUST, 3.
14. A post-nuptial agreement that the wife shall enjoy, for her sole and
separate use, property to which the husband has become entitled in her right,
if upon sufficient consideration and not in fraud of creditors, will be enforced
in equity. Kilby v. Godwin, 254.
15. A mother in her last sickness, holding certain securities for her sepa-
rate use delivered the same, together with some articles of personal use, such
as a watch and jewelry, to a third person, declaring them to be for the bene-
fit of her two minor children; and with the securities and articles, also deliv-
ered an inventory of the same. She died in a few days afterward-field, a
valid donatio cause mortis. id.
16. If the money which a married woman might have secured to her own
use is allowed to go into the business of her husband and be mixed with his
property, the same becomes the property of the husband for the purpose of
paying his debts. Humes v. Scruggs, 314.
17. Real estate purchased by the wife, is in equity liable for her husband's
debts, so far as it may be proved to have been paid for by money earned
through her personal services jointly with his, while living in the marital
relation, upon such real estate, carrying on a farm and keeping a public
house thereon. Sampson v. Alexander, 377.
18. In a contest between a wife and her husband's creditors, it must be
satisfactorily shown that the property was paid for with her own separate funds.
Seitz v. Mitchell, 506.
IV. Contracts and Conveyances.
19. The plaintiff contracted orally with a husband to expend labor upon the
real estate of his wife, without mention as to whom the credit was to be given;
it was done, in the husband's absence, under the care and to the satisfaction
of the wife; he did not deny his liability, but she did hers. Reld, that they
might be regarded as jointly liable. Verrill v. Parker, 58.
20. An ante-nuptial contract, in parol, whereby R. M. K., then afeme sole,
and being the owner in fee of certain lands, agreed with J. H., in considera-
tion that he would marry her, and would enter upon and make valuable im-
provements upon said lands, she would convey to him, by deed duly executed,
in fee simple, the same, is " an agreement upon consideration of marriage,"
and is void under the 5th sect. of the Statute of Frauds and Perjuries, not
being in writing and signed by the parties sought to be charged. Henry v.
Hepry, 122.
21. Such contract is an entire one, and the additional consideration named
therein, of entering upon and making improvements upon the land, in no man-
ner changes the character of the agreement so as to take it out of the statute.
Id.
22. The marriage and subsequent entry on the lands, and making valuable
improvements thereon, is not such part performance as takes the case out of the
statute. Id.
23. A deed defectively executed by the wife, in the attempted performance
of such contract, will not be perfected in the absence of a clear case for a
specific performance of a parol contract. ld.
24. Plaintiff, while covert, recovered judgment against a town in the name
of herself and husband, for personal injuries caused by an insufficient high-
way. The judgment was paid to the attorney by a town order drawn in his
favor. The attorney endorsed the order to plaintiff's husband, in the hus-
band's last illness, and the husband delivered it immediately to plaintiff, say-
ing, "This is yours; take care of it ;" and plaintiff put it with other papers
belonging to the husband. It had previously been agreed between the plain-
tiff and her husband that the proceeds of the judgment should be applied in
payment of a mortgage upon their homestead, and that the homestead should
be conveyed to plaintiff. The husband's administrator took the order with
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other papers and collected the money thereon, field, that the husband did
nothing to convert the judgment nor its proceeds to his own use, and that the
order remained the property of the plaintiff. 1erry v. Wheelock, 697.
INFANT. See EQUITY, 12, 13.
1. Emancipation may be established by contract between the parent and child,
as well as otherwise. It must be by consent, express or implied, of the parent,
if living, and is an entire surrender of all right to the care, custody and earn-
ings of the child, as well as a renunciation of parental duties. Inhabitants of
Lowell v. Inhabitants of Newport, 314.
2. An emancipated minor does not follow the settlement gained by the parent
after such emancipation. Id.
3. A deed by an infant to secure the re-payment of money advanced for
necessaries is voidable. Martin v. Gale, 315.
4. Infancy is a bar to an action on the case for false and fraudulent repre-
sentations by a vendor or pledgor as to his 'ownership of property sold or
pledged. Doran v. Smith, 698.
5. Where an infant judgment creditor, by the promise .of the judgment
defendant and his replevin bail, that, upon her entering satisfaction of such
judgment, the former will marry her, is induced, upon that consideration
alone, to enter such satisfaction, she may, upon her arriving at the age of
twenty-one years, and upon the failure of said defendant to marry her, disaf-
firm such contract, and in a suit against such judgment defendant and his
replevin bail, have such entry of satisfaction vacated, notwithstanding the fact
that at the time of making such marriage contract she was of the age of
eighteen years. Reish v. Thompson, 698.
INFORMATION. See HGHWAY, 4.
INJUNCTION. See CONTRACT, .8; EQUITY, 21.
1. An injunction to restrain a defendant from raising the water from his
mill-pond above a certain height, is not mandatory; but if it were strictly
mandatory, that would not constitute a valid objection to it. Longwood Valley
IPailroad Co. v. Baker, 122.
2. Equity will not interfere by mandatory injunction, unless extreme or very
serious damage, at least, will ensue from withholding that relief; and each
case must depend on its own circumstances. rd.
INNKEEPER.
1. A mere refreshment bar is not an inn. Queen v. Rymer, 315.
2. A householder living near an inn and coming only to a refreshment bar,
is not a traveller. id.
3. Defendant, an innkeeper, but declared against as bailee for hire, hitched
plaintiff's horse next a horse that he knew to be in the habit of kicking, whereby
plaintiff's horse was kicked. fedd, though plaintiff knew where his horse
was hitched, and made no objection thereto, but did not know of the vicious
habit of the other horse, that defendant was guilty of actionable negligence.
Clary v. Milley, 698.
INSANITY. See CRIMINAL LAW, 22; EVID NCE, 10-12.
1. INSANITY AS A DErzxCE IN CRIMINAL CASES, 449.
2. The act of self-destruction cannot be judicially regarded as proof per so
of insanity. It is but a fact, together with all other facts in the case, from
which the court or jury are to determine the testamentary capacity of the tes-
tator. EcElwee v. Ferguson, 97.
INSOLVENCY. See DEBTOR ANS) CREDITOR, 7.
INSURANCE. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 19-20 ; CORpORATrON,1.
I. Generally. See post, 7, 8.'
1. A foreign insurance company can transact business in a state only under
the system established by statute of the state. Thorne v. Travellers' Ins. Co..
22.
2. A resolution of an insurance company passed subsequent to the issuance
of the policy to the plaintiff, not communicated to him, and of which he had
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no notice or knowledge, cannot affect his rights under the policy. Mlfartin v.
Mutual Fire fins. Co., 754.
II. Marine.
3. A policy of insurance was effected on ship from 22d of January 1872 to
the 23d of January 1873, both inclusive.. The.e words were written in, on a
printed form, which also contained, in print, the words "at and from," and
"for this present voyage," and other similar words which were commonly
found in the forms of a voyage policy, and which had not been erased or
struck through : Hedd, that the policy was really a time policy, and its char-
acter was not affected by the printed words thus negligently left in the form.
Dudgeon v. Pembroke, 631.
4. In a time policy the law, in the absence of special stipulations in the
contract, does not imply any warranty that the vessel should be seaworthy.
Id.
5. A condition of a policy upon the merchandise of a store stipulated that
no petroleum should be kept on the premises. The term merchandise will
not permit a barrel of petroleum to be kept, though it be part of the usual stock
of the store. Birmingham Fire Ins. Co. v. Kroegher, 631.
II. Life. See EVIDENCE, 10-12.
6. It is competent for an insurance company to stipulate against an inten-
tional act of self-destruction, whether it be the voluntary act of a moral agent
or not. Bigelowv. Life Ins. Co., 315.
7. A policy of life insurance conditioned upon the payment of a given pre-
mium upon a day certain, becomes void unless the premium is paid within
the time named. Coombs v. Charter Oak Life Ins. Co., 58.
8. In an action upon a life insurance policy, the insured cannot introduce
evidence that the agent of the company before or at the time of the negotiation
of the insurance agreed to extend the time of payment of premium beyond
the time stated in the policy. Ad.
9. A policy of insurance taken out by husband and wife on their joint lives,
for the benefit of the survivor, is not impaired by a subsequent divorce, even
where there is no issue of the marriage. Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co.
v. Schaefer, 392.
10. An insurance on life is not a contract of indemnity, and it is valid,
if there is in good faith an insurable interest at the time of the making of the
policy, though it afterwards changes in amount or ceases altogether. rd.
11. Any reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit or advantage from the
continued life of another, creates an insurable interest in such life. Id.
12. CONTRACTS oF xivE INSURANCE, AS AFFECTED BY THE LATE CIVIL
WAE, 651.
IV. Fire.
13. A policy of insurance taken out by warehouse-keepers, against loss or
damage by fire on "merchandise, their own or held by them in trust, or in
which they have an interest or liability, contained in" a designated warehouse,
covers the merchandise itself, and not merely the interest or claim of the
warehouse-keepers. Home Ins. Co. v. Baltimore WareAouse Co., 162.
14. If the merchandise be destroyed by fire, the assured may recover the
entire value of the goods, not exceeding the sum insured, holding the re-
mainder of the amount recovered, after satisfying their own loss, as trustees
for the owners. Id.
15. Goods described in a policy as "merchandise held in trust" by ware-
housemen, are goods entrusted to them for keeping. The phrase "held in
trust" is to be understood in its mercantile sense. Id.
16. A policy was taken out by warehousemen on " m erch and ise" contained
in their warehouses, "their own, or held by them in trust, or in which they
have an interest or liability." Depositors of the merchandise, who received
advances thereon from the warehousemen, took out other policies covering
the same goods. Held, that the several policies constituted double insurance
and that they bear a loss proportionally. Id.
17. In a case of contributing policies, adjustments of loss made by an expert
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may be submitted to the jury, not as evidence of the facts stated therein, or
as obligatory, but for the purpose of assisting the jury in calculating the
amount of liability of the insurer upon the several hypotheses of fact men-
tioned in the adjustment, if they find either hypothesis correct. Home Ins. Co.
v. Baltimore Varehouse Co., 162.
18. What evidence may be submitted to a jury from which they may find a
waiver of preliminary proofs. Id.
19. No part of a letter written as an offer of compromise is admissible in
evidence. Id.
20. After loss by fire the parties in interest fixed the amount of loss and
damage, "' subject to terms and conditions of several policies." In an action
against the insurers : Idd, that this adjustment meant " subject to" all the
"terms and conditions of the policies" not superseded by the agreemeht.
Whipple v. N. Brit. 4" Mer. Fire Ins. Co., 377.
21. feld, further, that the question of liability was not affected by this
adjustment, which only determined the amount due in case of liability. Id.
22. When an insured agrees to disclose encumbrances of property, a failure
to do so avoids the policy. Beck v. Hibernia Ins. Co., 377.'
INTERNATIONAL LAW. See CONTRACT, 4; INSURANCE, 12.
INTOXICATING LIQUORS. See COXFLiCT OF LAws, 1.
1. Under the statute of Illinois giving a right of action against a person
selling liquor to a habitual drunkard, it is sufficient to aver and prove that
habitual intoxication was caused in part by such sale. It is a tort and plain-
tiff may recover as in other torts if there is enough evidence to support any
part of his charge. Both v. Eppy, 111.
2. In an action by a wife for selling liquor to her husband, evidence that
his intoxication led to loss of. his situation and inability to get other employ-
ment is admissible. Id.
JUDGMENT. See EQUITY 3, 9; ESTOPPEr,,4, 5 ; FOREIGN JUDGMENTS; FoB-
MER ADJUDICATION.
1. The court may strike off a judgment confessed by an attorney, whose
warrant is entirely wanting in a power to appear and confess the judgment.
Sweesey v. Kitchen, 58.
2. Setting aside a judgment is a matter of discretion and not the subject of
a writ of error. Id.
3. It is competent for a court of equity, upon an allegation that a judgment
is founded in fraud, to inquire whether the cause of action spread upon the
record is wholly fictitious and groundless. Doughty v. Doughty, 123.
4. A judgment by a court of one of the states, divorcing a husband and
wife domiciled in different states, is not entitled to extra-territorial recogni-
tion in case the party procuring it could hive given the defendant actual
notice of the suit, hut refused or neglected to do so. id.
5. The right of every person accused to have an opportunity to make
defence, is secured by a rule of general law; a judgment pronounced in vio-
lation of it is not entitled to general recognition. Id.
6. The judgment of a state court will be regarded by the federal courts
sitting within the territorial limits of the state in which the same is rendered,
as a domestic judgment. Owens v. Grotzian, 181.
7. The service of summons by a party to the action is an irregularity that
is waived by the other party unless objected to before the entry of judgment,
and it cannot therefore be taken advantage of by a third party when the judg-
ment is attacked in a collateral proceeding. Id.
8. "Party to the action," as used in sect. 47, ch. 66, p. 456, R. S. Minn.,
held, to extend only to parties named in the proceedings, and not to those
who, though interested, do not appear on the record. Id.
9. A sentence of a court pronounced against a party without hearing him,
or giving him an opportunity to be heard, is not a judicial determination of




10. The jurisdiction acquired by the seizure of property in a proceeding in
rem for its condemnation for alleged forfeiture, is not to pass upon the ques-
tion of forfeiture absolutely, but to pass upon that question after opportunity
has been afforded to its owner and parties interested to appear and be. heard
upon the charges for which the forfeiture is claimed. To that end some noti-
fication of the proceedings, beyond that arising from the seizure, prescribing
the time within which the appearance must be made, is essential. 11indsor v.
.31c eigh, 225.
11. In proceedings before the District Court in a confiscation case, moni-
tion and notice were issued and published, but the appearance of the owner,
for which they called, when made was stricken out, his right to appear being
denied by the court. Held, that the subsequent sentence of confiscation of his
property was as inoperative upon his rights as though no monition or notice
had ever been issued. The legal effect of striking out his appearance was to
recall the monition and notice as to him. Id.
12. The doctrine that where a court has once acquired jurisdiction it has
a right to decide every question which arises in the cause, and its judgment,
however erroneous, cannot be collaterally assailed, is only correct vAhen the
court proceeds, after acquiring jurisdiction of the cause, according to the
established modes governing the class to which the case belongs, and does
not transcend, in the extent or character of its judgment, the law which is
applicable to it. Id.
13. Where in a litigated case one of three co-defendants made default, and
the other two consented to ajudgment against all three, for a sum agreed upon
as fixing the amount of plaintiff's damages, upon the condition that they
should be released upon payment of their two-thirds of the amount : Ldd,
that this agreement would not prevent the enforcement against them of the
remainder of the judgment, and that such a state of facts would not authorize
equity to interfere by injunction to prevent its collection from them. Knight
v. Cherry, 572.
14. The estoppel of judgment on a verdict applies in the case of title to
realty only to those portions of the realty whereof the title was formally
put in issue. City of Providence v. Adams, 698.
15. Where a judgment, rendered by a district court of the United States,
comes in question collaterally, it will be presumed that such court had such
jurisdiction. Hays v. Ford, 699.
16. Court has no power to revise judgment after the term. Amazon Ins.
Co. v. Partridge, 755.
JUDICIAL SALE.
The policy of the law does not require courts to scrutinize the proceedings
qf a judicial sale with a view to defeat them. White v. Lening, 254.
JUROR AND JURY. See MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 6 ; TnARw..
JUSTICE OF THE PEACE. See MANDAmUS, 5.
LACHES. See EQUITY, I; LANDLORD AND TENANT, 8; LIMITATIONS, STAT-
UTE OF, 2 ; Lis PENDENS; VENDOR, 4, 9.
LAND. See CoNvRsIoN; FRAUDS, STATUTE OF, 7.
LANDLORD AND TENANT. See TnasPAss, I.
1. A lease was for a store-room with the stipulation that if the lessee should
Cat any time during the continuance of this lease attempt to remove or mani-
fest an intention to remove his goods and effects out of or off the premises,
without having paid * * * the lessor may proceed * * * to distrain and
collect the whole as if hy the conditions of this lease the whole rent was pay-
able in advance." It was not required that the attempt or intention to
remove the goods should be fraudulent in order to authorize a distress.
Goodwin v. Sharkey, 59.
2. The tenant assented to the distress and within four months proceedings




3. Where a personal covenant is made by a tenant not to build without the
landlord's approval, a subsequent lessee of the same landlord of an adjoining
plot cannot compel the landlord to enforce for his benefit the covenant with
the first tenant. .31aster v. Hansard, 436.
4. Landlords in the District of Columbia have a tacit lien upon personal
chattels of the tenant upon the premises, commencing with the tenancy and
continuing for three months after the rent is due, and until the termination
of any action for such rent brought within the said three months. Beall v.
White, 506.
5. Statutory liens have without possession the same operation and efficacy
that existed in common-law liens where the possession was delivered. Id.
6. Personal chattels on the premises, sold in the ordinary course of trade,
without knowledge of the lien, are not subject to its operation. Id.
7. Where the original term of a lease for ninety-nine years, renewable for
ever, has expired, and the owner of the leasehold interest has failed to obtain
a renewal within the term, according to the literal wording of the covenant,
equity will relieve him, and compel the owner of the reversion to execute a
new lease, provided the application be made in a reasonable .time. Banks v.
Ilaskie, 699.
8. But gross laches on the part of the owner of the leasehold interest in
making his demand for a new lease after the term has expired, will be an
insuperable bar to relief in equity. Id.
9. Any default, as well as any overt act of a lessor, that renders the tene-
ment dangerous, may be treated by the lessee as an eviction. Alger v.
Kennedg, 755.
10. If the lessor unlawfully evict the lessee, his right to rent thereupon
ceases. Id.
11. In every lease there is, unless excluded by some express agreement, an
implied obligation on the part of the lessee'to so use the property as not un-
necessarily to injure it. United States v. Bostwilck, 378.
12. It is in effect a covenant against voluntary waste, but nothing more. Id.
13. The United States when they contract with their citizens are controlled
by the same laws that govern the citizen in that behalf. Id.
14. The principle of estoppel which prevents a tenant from denying his
landlord's title, applies to the relation that exists between the hirer and letter
of a house, standing upon the laud of a third person, as personal estate.
Byder v. Mansel, 590.
15. An agreement under seal for the lease of a store for a term certain at a
fixed rent, " the said A. D. (the lessee) to have the preference of renting
said property so long thereafter as it shall be rented for a store ;" the stipu-
lation was void for uncertainty. Delashmutt v. Thomas 699.-
LARCENY. See CRxINAL LAw, V.
LEASE. See LANDLqRD AND TENANT.
LEGACY. See HUSBAND AND WIFE, 12.
An action at law will not lie for a legacy against the administrator of an
executor who has converted to his own use the assets of his testator ; the re-
medy is by a proceeding in equity. Coates v. Mackie, 59.
LIBEL. See CONTEMPT, 3.
1. The publication of a report of proceedings at a meeting of poor law
guardians, at which ex parte charges of misconduct against the medical officer
of the Union were made, is not privileged. Purcell v. Sowler, 506.
2. Where letters are reasonably susceptible of a libellous construction the
jury must pass upon their meaning. Hart v. Wall, 507.
LIEN. See EQUITY, 14 ; LANDLORD AND TENANT, 5, 6 ; VENDOR, 2.
LIMTATIONS, STATUTE OF. See AcCOUNT; BANKRUPTCT, 5; MUNICI-
PAL CORPORATIoN, 4; PARTNERSHIP, I ; TREspAss, 2; TRUST. 16.
I. The Statute of Limitations does not ran against an attorney until his




2. Equity follows the law in refusing relief, wbere time has elapsed which
at law would have barred the claim. But where the statute is sought to be
used against good conscience and the plaintiff has not been guilty of laches,
equity will remove the legal bar arising from lapse of time. Ecclesiastical
Commissioners v. North Eastern Railway Co., 439.
3. Where, therefore, a legal fraud has been committed (in this case a tres-
pass upon the plaintiff's coal mines by an adjoining owner, more than six
years before the bill was filed), but which was not discovered or discoverable
by the plaintiff until a reasonable time (some two years) before the bill was
filed, the Statute of Limitations is not a good defence. .d.
4. As to partners, the Statute of Limitations begins to run as soon as a
partnership dissolves, or there is any exclusion of one partner by the other.
Allen v. Woonsocket Co., 700.
LIS PENDENS.
The benefit of the rule relating to lis pendens may be lost by such long
continued inaction as amounts to gross negligence. Fox v. Reeder, 573.
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION.
1. Any act done w.ilfully and purposely to the prejudice and injury of
another, which is unlawful, is, in a legal sense, malicious, and is also in fact
malicious. Pullen v. Glidden, 379.
2. If the defendant show that he was advised by counsel that plaintiff was
liable to the prosecution, he need not show that he was advised to bring it.
Burris v. North, 573.
MANDAMUS. See ELECTIONS, 2. ERROR AND APPEAL, 8-10.
1. An answer to an application for a mandamus, setting up any sufficient
reason for refusing the writ, though in other respects evasive and irresponsive,
should not be quashed as a whole. Legg v. Mayor of Annapolis, 25.
.2. A mandamus does not lie to prevent a person from being disturbed in
the exercise of the functions and powers pertaining to his office. .d.
3. Mandamus will lie to the judges of an inferior court to seal a bill of em-
ceptions, but not to settle it in a particular way. Benedict v. owell, 507.
4. A mandamus will not issue to dictate how a discretion shall be exercised.
Id.
5. A justice of the peace, after be has once rendered judgment in a cause,
has no further power or control over it, to vacate or set it aside, or to render
a new judgment, and what is beyond his authority of his own motion to do,
he cannot be lawfully required by the mandate of another court to perform.
O'Brian v. Tallman, 507.
MANSLAUGHTER. See CRIMINAL LAw, VI.
MARITIME LIEN. See ADMIRALTY, 3, 6.
MARRIAGE. See HUSBAND AND WIPE, L
MASTER AND SERVANT. See COUNTY; MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 9, 10,
13; SHIPPING, 12.
1. When a railroad is beingconstructed and is in the exclusive possession
of a contractor for its construction and the railroad company has no control
thereof, such company is not liable for the damages resulting from the opera-
tion of such railroad. Kansas Central Railwa.y Co. v. Fitzsimmons, 573.
2. Parties not personally interfering with the progress of a work, but con-
tracting with third persons to do it, are not responsible for a wrongful act or
for negligence in the performance of the contract, if the act agreed to be done
be lawful. Wray v. Evans, 123.
3. The immediate employer of the agent or servant who causes the injury
is alone responsible for it. Id.
4. In an action by an employee against his employer for injuries caused by
the negligence of a fellow-servant, an allegation that the employer knew of
the latter's unfitness and recklessness is sustained by proof that such incom-
petency ought to have been known by the defendant. Where the employee is
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so grossly and notoriously unfit that not to know of his unfitness is negligence,
the law presumes notice to the employer. Chicago, 6-c., Railroad Co. v.
Doy!e, 484.
5. Where the machinery and cars of a railroad company are so constructed
that the slightest indiscretion on the part of the operatives would prove fatal,
it is such negligence on the part of the company as to render it liable for
damages occasioned thereby to an employee who is ignorant of such unskilfua
construction. T. 1' 6 I. -Railway Co. v. Fredericks, 59.
6. A master is liable to a servant for the negligence of a fellow-servant if
the master was negligent in the selection of the servant in fault, or in retain-
ing him after notice of his incompetency. McAndrews v. Burns, 633.
7. A fellow-servant is any one who serves and is controlled by the same
master. Id.
8. One is not liable for the negligence of his servant while employed under
the control of another. B~ourke v. White Moss Colliery Co., 633.
9. Where an employer places an employee of tender years at work in a
dangerous place, the former is bound to give the latter due caution and in-
struction. And if the employee, whilst so employed, be injured, the fact that
he could, by the use of his eyesight, have seen that such place was dangerous,
is not sufficient evidence to hold such employee accountable for contributory
negligence in causing such injury ; the question of negligence being one for
the jury to determine from all the facts. 11ill v. Gust, 700.
MEANDERED LAKE. See RIPAIUIAN RIGHTS.
MILL DAM. See INJUNCTION, 1.
MINES AND MINERALS. See EASEMENT, 2-4.
1. The right to work mines is a right of property, which, when duly ex-
ercised, begets no responsibility. lVi7son v. Waddell, 445.
2. The owner of minerals has the right to take away the whole of them in
his laud, accordingto the natural course of user. Injuries by consequent
overflow are not a valid ground for damages. Id.
3. Where there is an agreement between the owner and the tenant that when
the mines are worked the surface shall be restored, the owner may complain
if it be not restored ; but that gives no claim to any one else. Id.
4. A lease which gives the right to take out all the coal beneath a certain
surface, confers also the right to make all necessary openings to reach the
coal. Trout v. McDonald, 633.
5. T. made a voluntary conveyance of a farm to his wife, in 1867, but
remained in possession of the property till his death, in June 1873. In April
1873, he granted to MeD. the right to mine coal on a part of this farm.
MeD. worked a mine under the lease during T.'s lifetime, and after his death
with the widow's knowledge. MeD. never knew of the existence of this deed
till July t874. It was not recorded till August 1874. After the husband's
death, his widow received payments of royalty under the lease, but afterwards
filed a bill to restrain MicD. from entering upon the property to mine coal:
hIeld, that she had ratified and confirmed the lease, and was bound by it. Id.
MORTGAGE. See EQUITY, 23 ; HOMESTEAD, 2 ; NATIONAL BANK; PARTITION.
1. A bill of sale whereby a debtor conveys personal property to his creditor
as security, and which provides that the property shall remain in the debtor's'
possession, and he have thirty days to redeem by paying the debt, is a mort-
gage. Blodgett v. Blodgett, 54.
2. A mortgagor of personal property, after condition broken, has an equity
of redemption that may be asserted if he brings his bill to redeem within a,
reasonable time. Ad.
3. A tender of the amount of the debt after the law day has passed, unac-
cepted, does not divest the mortgagee of his legal title to the property mort-
gaged ; and chancery has jurisdiction to decree the redemption. Id.
4. When the mortgagee disposes of the property after tender made and
before final hearing, so that an order for its re-delivery cannot be made, a
decree may be entered for the amount of the mortgagor's interest therein. Id.
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5. A mortgagee in possession, after condition broken, with the assent of
the mortgagor, is presumed to occupy in his character of mortgagee ; and as
such is liable to account for rents and profits. Anderson v. Lanternian, 124.
6. The lien of a mortgage begins to run from the time of the entry for
record. Moods's Appeal, 255.
7. A husband obtained his wife's signature to a mortgage of her separate
property to secure his note, concealing from her that the paper was a mort-
gage. The mortgagee having no knowledge of the deception was entitled to
enforce the mortgage. Comegys v. Clark, 379.
8. Evidence that the consideration of a mortgage was a sealed note, an
antecedent debt of the mortgagor to the mortgagee, is admissible in support
of a mortgage which states the consideration as " cash in hand paid." Id.
9. The plaintiff made a demand on the mortgagee at a store two miles
from his residence, to render an account, to which the reply was that about
eleven hundred dollars were due on the mortgage; and when requested to
render a more particular account, he replied that he would not until obliged.
No objection was taken to the place where the demand was made. The parties
were acquainted with each other. The mortgagee shortly after left the state
and did not return. Four years intervened between the demand and the suit.
Held, that under the circumstances the demand was sufficient. Wallace v. ,S5te-
vens, 379. -
10. Courts of equity will, in certain cases, give effect to a mortgage of pro-
perty to be acquired subsequently. Bell v. White, 445.
11. The doctrine that an equitable mortgagee, by deposit of title deeds, is
entitled to foreclosure, does not extend to a pledge of personal chattels. Car-
ter v. W1rake, 447.
12. In a suit by a junior mortgagee to foreclose a mortgage, prior mort-
gagees are not necessary parties where the bill of the junior mortgagee seeks
only a foreclosure or sale of the equity of redemption. Jerome v. McCarter,
573.
13. A clause in a chattel mortgage, providing tht if the mortgagee shall
at any time deem himself insecure, he may taike possession of and sell the
property, vests in him an absolute discretion. Huebner v. Koebke, 756.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION. See CONTRACT, 5; COUNTY; NEGLIGENCE, 8.
1. The owner of a wooden building, situated in a city which has, by ordi-
nance, prohibited such erection in certain prescribed boundaries, may lawfully
move such building from one lot to another within the prescribed boundaries.
City of Cleveland v. Lenze, 124.
2. The legislature may authorize municipal corporations to levy special
assessments upon the adjoining lots for the improvement of highways within
the municipality; and this rule applies to highways by water as well as to
those of land. Johnson Y. Milwaukee, 191.
3. A corporation created for municipal purposes being superseded by new
and different corporations, created for accomplishing the same purposes,
ceases to exist except so far as its existence is expressly continued for special
objects, such as settling up its indebtedness and the like. Barkley v. Board
of Levee Commissioners, 255.
4. Municipal corporations, though not within ordinary limitation statutes,
are within the principle of an estoppel in pais. C. R. 4- P. Railroad Co. V.
City of Joliet, 316.
5. Municipal corporations, charged by statute or by charters accepted by
them with the care of streets, are liable for injuries caused by defective pave-
ments. City of Omaha v. Olmstead, 356.
6. The mere interest of a resident or taxpayer of a city is not, under ordi-
nary circumstances, sufficient to disqualify him as a juror in a case where the
city is a party. Id.
7. Bonds to aid in the construction of a railroad, if issued in pursuance of
a power conferred by the legislature, are valid commercial instruments, and
give the holder a good title to the same extent as in the case of bills of ex-
change and promissory notes. County Commissioners v. Clark, 380.
8. If the bonds show by their recitals that the power was exercised in the
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manner required by the legislature, and that the bonds were issued in confor-
mity to the prescribed regulations, proof that any or all of the recitals are in-
correct will not constitute a defence to the corporation in a suit on the bonds
or coupons. County Commissioners v. Clark, 380.
9. A city or town which derives an emolument from the exercise of powers
conferred upon it is liable for the negligent or unskilful exercise of these pow-
ers by its agents, or for the neglect of a duty which is imposed by or results
from the exercise of them. Aldrich v. Tripp, 380.
10. In such cases the officers engaged in the execution of the powers are to
be regarded as.the agents of such city or town. Id.
11. A county, under legislative authority, having voted to subscribe $250,000
to the stock of a railroad company, and the legislation permitting bonds to
be issued for the amount so subscribed, the county court issued bonds and
sold them at a large discount, until enough were sold to pay the $250,000.
Beld, that the county board exceeded its powers in issuing bonds to a larger
amount than the sum subscribed. Daviess County Court v. Howard, 428.
12. An authority to issue bonds to a specified amount is not an authority
to sell bonds to raise that amount. Id.
13. Though the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to render a
town or city liable for the trespasses of a street commissioner upon adjoining
lands when acting as a public officer merely, yet it does apply when he is
not only a public officer, but also acts under express authority of the city gov-
ernment while attempting to obey their directions. Woodcock v. City of Co-
lais, 445.
14. The pouring upon one's land a flood of water by a public sewer, is an
actionable wrong. Ashley v. City of Port Huron; 446.
15. A statute providing that " it shall be lawful for all persons of lawful
age, or for the agent of any corporate body, to subscribe any amount to the
capital stock of a company," does not include a municipal organization.
Township of East Oakland v. Skinner, 446.
16. A holder for value of county bonds is not affected by any irregularities
or frauds or unfounded assumption of authority on the part of the agents of
the town or county, but good faith is unavailing where there is an entire want
of authority in those who profess to act. County of Dallas v. McKenzie, 406.
17. A municipality must have legislative authority to subscribe to the cap-
ital stock of a bridge company before its officers can bind a body politic to the
payment of bonds purporting to be issued on that account. McClure v. Town-
ship of Oxford, 507.
18. A municipal corporation which has created a department in the muni-
cipal government may abolish it at any time unless restricted by some provi-
sion of its charter. Williams v. City of Newport, 567.
19. Where such a department is abolished the officers connected with it are
renderedfunctus officio, and unless there has been a contract between them
and the city for service for a time fixed, they have no right to any fuither
compensation. Id.
20. Such a contract is not implied by the mere election of an officer for a
term named. In such casethe officer * not bound to serve the full term nor
does the corporation bind itself to k .< the office in existence for him. Id.
21. A city, by a contract for its, .,n benefit, cannot relax the obligation of
a duty imposed on it by statute fc ehe public benefit. Williams v. Tripp, 613.
22. The doctrine that a municipality cannot be held liable for the conse-
quences of an act which it is legally authorized or is required to perform,
will not justify an invasion of private property even if the invasion is only
consequential. Id.
23. In the absence of a statute creating such liability, a municipal corpora-
tion is not liable for damages resulting from an authorized change in the grade
of a street, made with reasonable skill and care. Dore v. City of Milwaukee,
700.
24. If a statute requires compensation for injuries in such cases, and pro-
vides specific means for recovering it, the statutory remedy is exclusive. Id.
MURDER. See CnIn AL LiW, VII.
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NAME. See CORPORATION, 24.
NATIONAL BANK. See BANK; CORPORATIOr, 23.
A mortgage given to a national bank to secure a future loan is ultra vircs,
and therefore void; but one given to secure a pre-existing debt is valid.
Woods v. People's National Bank, 634.
NAVIGABLE STREAM. See MUNICIPAL CORPO.ATION, 2; RIPARIAN
RIGHTS ; WATERS AND WATERCOURSES.
NE EXEAT.
A ne exeat obtained upon affidavits substantiating declarations and acts of
the defendant, as evidence of his intention to depart the state, will not be
discharged upon a counter affidavit by the defendant, denying the intention.
l1ouseworth's Administrator v. Hendrickson, 125.
NEGLIGENCE. See BILLS AND NOTES, 20, 22; INNKEEPER, 3; Lis PEN-
DENS. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 5, 9 ; RAILROAD.
1. In an action against the owners of a steamer for injury to barges from
collision, the plaintiff having shown the collision and injury, may, in chief,
give evidence that defendant's pilot was incompetent. Bigley T. Williags, 125.
2. Because a plaintiff is himself negligent, or is acting in violation of a
law, he is not therefore prevented from recovering damages for an injury
which has resulted from the negligence of a defendant, where, but for the
want of ordinary care on the part of the defendant, the misfortune would not
have happened. Klipper v. Colfey, 381.
3. The plaintiff sued the defendant for an injury to his carriage and horses,
occasioned by the horses becoming frightened by the alleged negligent act of
the defendant. The plaintiff was warned of the danger in time to reach his
horses before the accident, and had he -reached them he might possibly have
held them in check and the injury have been avoided. ileld, that his failure
to reach them sooner did not constitute in law contributory negligence. Id.
4. The question of contributory negligence is properly presented to the jury
by a prayer which instructs them that they cannot find for the plaintiffs, if
they "shall find that the injury to the plaintiffs' hack and horses is attribut-
able to the combined negligence of the plaintiffs and defendants." Id.
5. In actions for personal injuries caused by railroad trains, where there
are qualifying circumstances, the question of negligence must be left to the
jury. Bonnet v. Delaware, L. 4. IV. Railroad Co., 508.
6. The plaintiff will not be nonsuited, unless, upon his own showing, he
is guilty of negligence which contributed to the injury. Where a man volun-
tarily places himself in a position of great danger, and makes a highway of
a railway track, where he has no right to be, and upon which dangerous
vehicles are constantly liable to pass, he is bound to exercise more than ordi-
nary care. Michigan Central Railroad Co. v. Carapan, 508.
7. What is proximate cause is a question for the jury. 31ilwaukee 6- "t.
Paul Railway Co. v. Kellogg, 574.
8. In an action for injuries to plaintiff's person by stepping through a hole
in a sidewalk, evidence that the walk was on one of the principal thorough-
fares of the city, and that the hole had existed there for several months, was
sufficient to warrant the jury in finding the city chargeable with notice of the
defect. Hall v. City of Fond du Lac, 756.
9. Contributory negligence will defeat an action for an injury arising from
failure of a company to maintain in repair a fence. Lawrence v. 31. L. S. 4.
W. Railway Co., 757.
NEGOTIABLE SECURITIES. See EQUITY, 25.
NEW TRIAL. See CRIMINAL LAW, 4,5.
1. An application for a new trial is a motion which must be served upon
the opposite party. Me Williams v. Bannister, 757.
2. A new trial should be granted to defendant only upon reasonable terms,
including payment of costs of the former appeal. Id.
NOTICE. See CORPORATION, 3; PARTNERSHIP, 5, 6, 9.
1. NOTICE TO PRINCIPAL, PRO
r 




2. A notice which the statute requires to be in writing, is insufficient where
it is not signed by appellant nor by any one for him and the record fails to
show that it was served by him in parson. Eaton v. Manitowoc County, 757.
NUISANCE. See DAMAGES, 1; MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 1, 14.
1. When an rcvtion itself constitutes a nuisance, as a building in a publiu
street obstructing its safe passage, its removal may be necessary for the abate-
ment of such nuisance. Brightman v. Inhabitants of Bristol, 60.
2. When the nuisance consists in the wrongful use of a building harmless
in itself, the remedy is to stop the use. Id.
3. The remedy for abating a public nuisance is by indictment and not by
removing it by force, without legal proceedings finding it to be a nuisance of
that character. Earp v. Lee, 
60.
4. An obstruction which prevents a lawful use of a public highway, besides
being a public nuisance, is a special injury to adjoining lot-owners. Petti,
bone v. iamilton, 191.
OFFICE AND OFFICER. See AGENT, 5 ; APPLICATION OF PAYMENTS, 2;
ATTACHMENT; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 5, 31; AUNICIPAL CORPORATION;
18-20.
1. When one of a board of officers is not legally elected, but is an officer
defacto, he may legally join in the action of the board with those who are
officers dejure. Dutton v. Simmons, 60.
2. Taking from an officer the authority to perform the ditties of the office
is equivalent to removal, and if the latter cannot be done directly it cannot
be done indirectly by the former method. Pant v. Auditor, 737.
OYSTERS. See WATERS AND WATERCOURSES, 3.
PARENT AND CHILD. See INFANT.
PARTITION.
1. When owelty is required to equalize partition between two tenants in
common, the estate of one being mortgaged, it should, if to be paid by the
unencumbered owner, he paid to the mortgagee of the other and credited on
the mortgage note. Green v. Arnold, 701.
2. Of two tenants in common one mortgages his interest in the common
estate to the other and no entry or foreclosure has taken place. Held, the
mortgagee can have partition in equity. Id.
PARTNERSHIP. See CoNvEnsION, 2; LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF, 4.
1. After a partnership was dissolved, a note was given in the partnership
name by one of two partners for a pre-existing partnership debt. In an action
on tie note against the other partner, it was held: That if the debt was barred
by limitations at the time the note was given, the defendant would not be
liable upon the note, and the admission or promise of the partner who signed
the note could not revive the right of action against the defendant. Newman
v. McComas, 60.
2. The separate real estate of a member of a partnership is bound first, for
his separate debts, second, for the debts of the partnership. Bailey v. Ken-
ncdJ, 191.
3. After the dissolution of a partnership. even if it be conceded that the
liquidating partner has authority to give an acknowledgment of debt in the
firm name, yet he has no authority, by implication of law, to give a note in
the firm name which increases the amount of the indebtedness, or extends
the time of liability, or in any way amounts to a now contract. Sinith v.
jS'ieldon, 292.
4. After the dissolution of a partnership, if one partner buys out the interest
of the others, and agrees to assume the debts, he becomes, as between the par-
ties, the principal debtor, and the retiring partners merely sureties, and cred-
itors of the firm having knowledge of this equity are bound to regard it in their
subsequent dealings with the parties. Id.
5. It is not an absolute inflexible rule that there must be a publication in a
newspaper to protect a retiring partner. Any means that are fair means to
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publish as widely as possible the fact of dissolution are proper to be consid-
ered on the question of notice. Lovejoy v. Spafford, 255.
6. Only those who are in the habit of dealing with a partnership are entitled
to actual notice of dissolution, and a single cash sale does not make the vendor
such a dealer. Merritt v. Williams, 381.
7. One of the members of an insolvent firm cannot, either before or after
dissolution of the partnership, make a valid assignment of all its effects for the
benefit of creditors, against the will of a co-partner. Volland v. Dr.e, 509.
8. A ratification by such co-partner will relate back to the time of executing
the assignment, except as against intervening rights. Id.
9. One partner cannot apply the funds of a partnership in payment of his
private debt without the assent of his co-partner. Thomas v. Pennrich, 575.
10. The members of a firm doing a banking business under the name of
"The Citizens' Bank," are all individually liable for the debts of the firni ;
and a member of such partnership, upon withdrawing from it, must give notice
of his withdrawal, otherwise he remains liable for the subsequent debts of the
firm. Shamburg v. Ruggles, 635.
11. A new partner entering a firm is not liable for the antecedent debts of
the firm, unless he has agreed to assume them. Id.
PASSENGER. See RAILROAD, 9-16, 19.
PATENT.
1. Juries in an action at law for the infringement of a patent, are required
to find the actual damages sustained by thb plaintiff in consequence of the
unlawful acts of the defendant. Birdsall v. Coolidge, 126.
2. The profits made by an infringer of a patented invention are the worth
of the advantage he obtained by such use, or, in other words, they are the
fruits of that advantage. Meys v. Conover, 509.
3. A surrender of a patent is a legal cancellation of it, and cannot be the
foundation of the assertion of a right after the surrender. Meyer v. Pritchard,
509.
4. The re-issue of the patent has no connection with or bearing upon ante-
cedent suits ; it has as to bubsequent suits. Id.
PAYMENT. See APPLICATION OF PAYMENTS.
PILOT. See SHIPPING, 11, 12.
PLAT. See HIoUwAY, 1, 2.
PLEADING.
1. Where damages for the failure to deliver goods sold are sought to be set
up by way of counter-claim by the purchaser, the answer, which shows that
delivery of the goods and payment therefor were concurrent conditions, with-
out averring an offer or readiness to pay on his part, does not state facts suf-
ficient to constitute a counter-claim. Chambers v. Frazier, 638.
2. When it is one of the terms of a contract that an engine is good, and
if not found so on trial shall be made good, the right to return it, in case
of failure, is in pursuance, and not in avoidance, of the contract, and a count
for breach of warranty is not inconsistent with one averring return. Kimball
and Austin .'g Co. v. Vroman, 600.
POWER. See ExEcuToR, 3; JMuNioIPAL COR-PORATION, 11, 12.
A power to sell or exchange, when exercised, overrides all other distinct
powers ; for it is necessarily exclusive of all others ; but when a mere power
to convey (as distinguished from a power to sell) is once executed in favor
of a voluntary beneficiary, it cannot be revoked without reserving a power
of revocation, and will not, therefore, be superseded by a subsequent convey-
ance, equally voluntary, made under the same power. Bowen v. Chase, 511.
PRACTICE. See JUDGMENT, 7 ; NEGLIGENCE, 1 ; NEW TRIAL, I.
1. Stipulations between counsel relative to the course of proceeding in a
cause, as, e. g., to submit the case on printed briefs, cannot be withdrawn by
one party without the consent of the other, except by leave of the court upon
cause shown. Mulcr v. Dows, 381.
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2. A clerical error giving defendant too short a time in a rule to plead, but
the notice to defendant stating the right time, and default not being taken till
after the right time, is immaterial. -fhowe v. Maltz, 636.
PRESUMPTIONS. See EQUITY, 22; IEVIDENCE, 9 ; RAILROAD, 19.
PUBLIC SCHOOLS.
1. Boards of education are authorized by law to adopt and enforce neces-
sary rules for the government of the schools under their management.
Sewell v. Board of Education, 636.
2. A bequest to the members composing the School District Board by name,
and to their successors in office, of moneys to be expended in the purchase of
books for a district library-they being the officers designated by law to per-
form similar duties for the district-is in effect a bequest to the district.
.aynard v. Fractional School District, 326.
3. A school district may receive a gift of money to be expended in books
for a district library, at the unrestricted discretion of its officers, notwith-
standing that by statute the purchase of hooks for a district library, with dis-
trict moneys, is subject to various limitations. Id.
PUBLIC USE. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, 9, 28.
RAILROAD. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 10; DAMAGES, 7; MASTER AND
SERVANT, 1, 5; NEGLIGENCE, 5, 6.
1. Where there is no direct proof that a building near a railroad is set on
fire by sparks from a locomotive, it is a question for the jury. P. 4- ?. Rail-
road Co. v. Hendrickson, 191.
2. Where a barn quite near the track of a railroad was negligently burned
by sparks from a locomotive, .1eld, not evidence of contributory negligence
that the owner suffered the roof to be in such condition as that it was more
liable to take fire than if it had a secure and safe roof. Id.
3. In order to hold a landholder for contributory negligence where injury
is done to his property by fire from an engine on a railroad, he must have
done some act or omitted some duty which is the proximate cause of the injury
concurring with the negligence of the railroad company. Id.
4. A railroad Company is not liable for a purely accidental fire caused by
fire escaping from one of its engines. Leavenworth, L. 4- G. Railroad Co. v.
Cook, 575.
5. A railroad company is bound to keep its track free from combustible
matter, whereby fire may be communicated from its locomotives to adjoining
property. Del., L. 6- 11r Railroad Co. v. Salmon, 637.
6. The owner of lands adjacent to a railroad is not obliged to keep his lands
contiguous to the track free from leaves or other combustible matter coming
or being thereon. He may cultivate, build upon and use his lands, or leave
them in a state of nature, as he may see proper. .1d.
7. An owner will not be barred of recovery of damages for injury by fires
caused by the negligence of the company, by the fact that the company acquired
the right of way through his land by grant or condemnation. For such dam-
ages the remedy by action remains, notwithstanding the conveyance or con-
demnation. Id.
8. By a provision in the charter of a railroad company, its road was declared
to be a public highway for the use of steam engines and cars propelled by
steam engines only: .HUeld, that the company was liable for injuries from fire
thrown by the locomotive of another company which the defendants suffered
and permitted to be run on the road without any spark arrester on it, its defect-
ive condition being known to the defendants' train despatcher who exercised
no supervision over it. -1d.
9. Where a railroad train wrongfully fails to stop for a passenger, he is
entitled to recover nominal damages, and such actual damages as he may
sustain by reason of the delay; but he has no right to inflict injury on himself
to inhance the damages, as, e. g., by walking to the next station. J. B. 4-
TV Railwayj Co. v. Birney, 61.
10. Running passenger car beyond the platform is evidence of negligence





11. Although the burden of proof falls upon a plaintiff to establish the
negligence of a railroad company sued for an injury caused by their cars
running off the track ; still, where the plaintiff is guilty of no negligence, and
the cause of the accident is not disclosed by the attending circumstances, the
burden of explanation falls upon the company to show that there was no fault
-upon their part; and a jury would be authorized to presume them guilty of
negligence if they fail to do so. Stevens v. E. 4. N. A. Railway Co., 284.
12. A person taking a cattle train is entitled to demand the highest possible
degree of care regardless of the kind of train he takes. Indianapolis 6- St.
Louis Railroad Co. v. Horst, 317.
13. A passenger, on the station to which he was going being announced,
and after the car had entered the station, left his seat and stood inside the
closed door of the car, for the purpose of hastening his departure from the car.
While he was so standing, the car came into collision with another car, and
the passenger was thrown down and injured. The question whether he was
in the exercise of reasonable care, was for the jury. Barden v. Boston, .c.,
.Railroad Co., 664.
14. A railway company has the right to require passengers to show tickets
or pay fare, and a rule directing its conductors to remove from the cars those
who refuse to comply with the requirement is reasonable. Shelton v. Lake
Shore, 4-c., Railway Co., 510.
15. The fact that a ticket has been purchased by a passenger, which was
afterwards wrongfully taken up by a conductor of one of the defendant's trains,
will not relieve the passenger from the duty of providing himself with a ticket
or paying fare on another train of the defendant in which he may be a pas-
senger. Id.
16. In such case, the right of action of the passenger would be for the
wrongful taking up of the ticket, and not for having been removed from a
train by another conductor for refusing to pay fare. Id.
17. A railroad company is not liable for injuries occasioned by its buildings
or structures being blown down by storms, where it has used that care and
skill in their structure and maintenance which men of ordinary prudence and
skill usually employ. Pittsburgh, fi. W. 4- C. Railway Co. v. Brigham, 510.
18. A railroad company is not liable for an injury to a person resulting
from its failure to exercise ordinary skill and care in the erection or mainte-
nance of its station house, where at the time of receiving the injury, such
person was at such station house by mere permission and sufferance, and not
for the purpose of business. Pittsburgh, R. W. & C. Railway Co. v. Bingham,
637.
19. In an action under the Maryland statute against a corporation operat-
ing a railroad lying partly in Maryland and partly in Pennsylvania, chartered
by the laws of both states, brought in Maryland for the use of the widow and
infant child of a deceased person, who was killed while in the employment
of the defendant, by an accident occurring in Pennsylvania, it was hed,-
a. That this statute did not apply to the case of a wrongful act or neglect
occurring in another state, whereby death had been caused.
b. That in the absence of anything to the contrary, the presumption was
that the common law prevailed in the state where the alleged wrong was done,
and the courts here acting upon that presumption afforded the common-law
remedy for the injury complained of.c. But that no such presumption obtained respecting the positive statute law
of the state.
d. That it was immaterial that the deceased was a citizen of this state at
the time of his death. State of Maryland v. Pittsburgh and Connellsville Rail-
road Co., 681.
20. The case of The Northern Central Railway Co. v. Scholl, 16 Md. 331,
distinguished from this case, on the ground that the wrong complained of in
that case was in violation of a right that the wrongdoer was bound to respect
everywhere within the limits of the United States, and, therefore, the case
involved no consideration of the mere local law of Pennsylvania. Id.




A person connected with the management may not be appointed receiver
of an insolvent corporation. Freeholders v. State Bank, 575.
REMOVAL OF CAUSES.
1. In a suit by a plaintiff of one state against several defendants of a dif-
ferent state, where the matter in controversy is wholly between them, and can
be fully determined between the plaintiff and the defendants, either of the
defendants, actually interested in the controversy, may, under the Act of 1875,
remove such suit to the Circuit Court. Stapleton v. Reynolds, 48.
2. A suit was brought in a court of the state of Tennessee by a citizen of
that state against a citizen of the state of Georgia. Under the Act of 1867,
the party who was a citizen of Tennessee could not have the cause removed
to the Circuit Court, but the citizen of Georgia could. Hurst v. Western 4.
Atlantic Railroad Co., 127.
3. Sect. 639 of the Rev. Stats. of the United States is not entirely repealed
by the Act of March 3d 1875. The third subdivision of sect. 639, relating to
suits between citizens of the states in which they are brought and citizens of
other states, not being inconsistent with the Act of 1875, is not repealed by
it. Cook v. Ford, 417.
4. The result of the provisions, taken together, is, first, that no citizen of
a state in which a suit is brought can remove it, except on petition filed before
or at the term at which it might first be tried; second, that vhere a suit is
between citizens of different states, neither of whom is a citizen of the state in
which the suit is brought, neither party can remove it except on petition filed
before or at the term at which it might first be tried; third, but when the suit
is between a citizen of the state in which it is brought and a citizen of another
state, the latter may remove it by petition filed at any time before trial or
finaf hearing, upon making an affidavit of prejudice or local influence, which
will prevent his obtaining a fair trial. Id.
5. "Before the final hearing or trial of the suit," in the Act of 1867,
means "before final judgment in the court of original jurisdiction where the
suit is brought." The Act of March 3d 1875 requires the petition to be filed
" before the final trial." The decisions under the Act of 1867 are, therefore,
equally applicable to that of 1875. Lowe v. Williams, 575.
RES ADJUDICATA. See FORmER AD JuDcATioN.
RIPARIAN RIGHTS. See WATERS AND W&TERCOURSES.
1. The owner of land bounded by any meandered lake or pond, takes as
such no fee in the bed or soil under the water, but has a right to accretions
formed by slow and imperceptible degrees upon or against his land. .Boorman
v. Sunnachs, 691.
2. Riparian rights are subject to the paramount right of the public to use
navigable lakes or ponds for the purposes of commerce and navigation. Id.
3. It is error to determine such a claim in favor of the claimant upon mere
proof that persons watching the process could not see the water recede. Id.
4. A riparian proprietor, whose land is bounded by a navigable river, has
the right of access to the navigable part of the river from the front of his lot,
and the right to make a landing or wharf, subject to such general rules as the
legislature may think proper to prescribe for the protection of the rights of
the public. Baltimore 4- Ohio Railroad Co. v. O'aw, 61.
5. Riparian rights proper rest upon title to the bank of the water, and are
the same whether the riparian owner own the soil under the water or not.
Dietrich v. N. W. Union Railroad Co., 702.
6. Distinguished from appropriation and occupation of the soil under the
water, a riparian owner upon navigable water, whether or not he own the
soil to the thread of the stream, has a right (unless prohibited by local law)
to construct in shoal water in front of his land proper wharves or piers, in
aid of navigation, and at his peril of obstructing navigation, through the water
far enough to reach actually navigable water. Id.
7. As a right of necessity, when water, navigable or not navigable, is by
natural causes wearing away and intruding upon its banks, the riparian owner
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may, as against the public, at his peril of obstructing the public use when the
water is navigable, and at his peril of the necessity, intrude as far as may be
necessary to protect his land against the action of the water. Dietrich v. N.
Vf. Union Railroad Co., 702.
8. The proprietor of lands on a navigable stream takes usque adfilum aqua!,
subject to the public right of navigation. Delaplaine v. C. 6- N. IM. Railway
Co., 703.
9. The riparian proprietor upon navigable lakes and ponds takes the land
only to the water's edge. Id.
10. The riparian proprietor upon a navigable lake has as such the exclu-
sive right of access to and from the lake in front of his land, and of building
there piers and wharves in aid of navigation, not interfering with the public
easement. Id.
11. A lot bounded by a street "as it runs by the course of the river" does
not cross the street to the river so as to make the owner a riparian owner.
Allegheny City v. Moorehead, 64.
12. The street was widened by deposits of dirt along the river bank, and
was widened by the city to a definite width. This was not an accretion by
alluvion. Id.
RIVER. See RIPARIAN RIGHTS; WATERS AND WATERCOURSES.
SALE. See CONrLICT OF LAWS, 1, 2 ; PLEADING, 1.
1. Defendant gave plaintiffs, manufacturers of safes, a written order for a
£]No. 4 safe with combination lock," and plaintiffs sent a safe answerable to
the order. Held, that there was no implied warranty as to the merits of the
lock, but only that it should be such as the order called for. Tilton S/e Co.
v. Tisdale, 
62.
2. When the right of rescission exists, it must be exercised within a rea-
sonable time, or the property becomes the purchaser's, and he must pay for it
according to the contract, subject to the right to recoup such damages as he
has sustained by reason of the fraud of the vendor. Id.
3. On the sale of an article for a specific purpose there is a warranty by the
vendor that it is reasonably fit for the purpose. Randall v. .Zetrson, 318.
4. In the sale of a horse there is no implied warranty of soundness. Mat-
lock v. Meyers, 576.
SALVAGE. See ADMIRALTY, 13.
SCHOOL. See PUBLIC SCHOOL.
SET-OFF. See PLEADING, 1.
1. In an action for the price of specific articles bargained and sold, but not
delivered, defendant may set up, by way of a recoupment, any injury to such
articles occasioned by the fault or negligence of the vendor, subsequent to the
sale and prior to the time of delivery. Barrow v. Window, 62.
2. The insolvency of a party seeking to enforce his judgment, furnishes a
sufficient ground for the interposition of a court of equity to enable the debtor
to avail himself of a set-off. Marshall v. Cooper, 62.
S. The assignment of a non-negotiable demand arising on contract, before
due, defeats a set-off by the debtor of an independent cross demand, on which
no right of action had accrued at the time of tha assignment. Fuller v. Steig-
litz, 127.
4. The bona.fide holder by assignment of a judgment against two defendants
is entitled to have a judgment recovered against him by one of such defend-
ants, after such assignment, set off against the assigned judgment, even though
the second judgment is assigned to a third person, for value, without notice.
Brown v. Hendrickson, 619.
5. A judgment debtor, having recovered a judgment in another court against
his creditor, is entitled to relief in equity by a decree for set-off. TWebstei v.
.fcDaniel, 703.
6. Though both judgments are legal demands equity will relieve, because
they are not judgments recovered in the same court. Id.
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7. Matters ex contractu arising out of a different transaction from the one
in suit may be proved by way of set-off. lallpenny v. Bell, 256.
8. A bailee, convcrting goods on which he has bestowed labor and acquired
a lien, may, in an action of trover brought by the owner, set up his lien-claim
in reduction of damages. Longstreet v. Phile, 510.
SETTLEMENT. See INwFA.
SHERIFF'S DEED. See CORPORATiON, 6.
SHIPPING. See ADMIRALTY, 1 ; INSURANCE, 4.
1. Where a steamer, lying at the time at the wharf at St. Louis, was taken
into the service of the United States by a quarter-master of the United States,
for a trip to different points on the Mississippi river, the compensation for the
service required being stated at the time to the captain, and no objection be-
ing made to tile service or compensation, and the service was rendered, the
possession, command and management of the steamer being retained by its
owner : Meld, that the United States were charterers of the steamer upon a
contract of affreightment, and they were not liable under such a contract to
the owner for the value of the steamer, though she was destroyed by fire
whilst returning from the trip without his fault. Shaw v. The United States,
63,
2. Spare spars and cargo burnt to supply a steam pump, the vessel having
commenced her voyage with an adequate supply of coal, are subjects of gen-
eral average. Robinson v. Price, 318.
3. On the back of a bill of lading was paeted a printed paper prescribing
the number of lay days and the rate of demurrage to be paid by the " cargo,
consignee, or assignee," after their separation. It appearing in evidence that
the consignee had received a duplicate bill of lading with a similar printed
paper pasted on its back, and that he had thereafter received the cargo with-
out objection : Held, that the printed paper was a part of the bill of lading.
.Fllknburg v. Clark, 90.
4. In an action on the case by a ship-owner against the consignee of the
cargo for demurrage, Held, that if the consignee as such had nothing to do
with the shipment there would be no privity of contract between him and the
ship-owner, and before acceptance of the cargo, the law would imply no con-
tract on his part to pay demurrage; but that the evidence as to acceptance,
with any explanatory testimony, should be left to the jury with the instruc-
tion that from an acceptance unexplained of goods under abill of lading con-
taining provisions for demurrage, a contract for payment of this demurrage
by the consignee would be implied. Id.
5. On the back of a bill of lading was an endorsement, " Pay the demur-
rage to order of Messrs. C. & K.," signed C. P. R.,-C. P. R. being the
ship's captain. fleld, that the claim for demurrage could not be assigned by
the endorsement so as to enable the assignee to sue in his own name; bills of
lading not being negotiable so as to allow the holder to sue at common law,
although made thus negotiable by statute in England and held thus negotia-
ble in admiralty practice in this country. Id.
6. Heldfurthier, that this endorsement was to be construed merely as giv-
ing authority to receive the demurrage and to discharge the claim therefor.
Id.
7. The consignee of a cargo ordered in his own name cannot avoid liability
for demurrage by giving notice to the ship's captain on arrival that the cargo
was ordered for an hitherto undisclosed principal. Id.
8. Demurrage is a mere expression, being compensation for detention,
often, but not always, regulated by contract. The rate thereof, even if agreed
on, is not always concluded by the agreement. Id.
9. The master of a ship has no authority to sign a bill of lading for goods
not actually put on board. .Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Co. v. Wilkins, 382.
10. A master cannot hypothecate either ship or cargo, without communica-
ting with the owner. Kleinworth v. Cassa Afarittima, 448.
It. The Act of March 30th 1852, '1 to provide for the better security of the
lives of passengers on board of vessels propelled in whole or part by steam,
and for other purposes," does not exempt the owners and masters of a steam
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vessel and the vessel from liability for injuries caused by the negligence of
its pilot or engineer, but makes them liable for all damages sustained by a
passenger or his baggage from any neglect to comply with the provisions of
the law, no matter where the fault may lie; and in addition to this remedy,
any person injured by the negligence of the pilot or engineer may have his
actioi directly against those officers. Sherlock v. Alling, 455.
12. The relation between the owner or master and pilot, as that of master
and employee, is not changed by the fact that the selection of the pilot is
limited to those who have been found by examination to possess the requisite
knowledge and skill, and have been licensed by the government inspectors.
Id.
13. The plaintiff agreed to charter a ship for twelve months after the com-
pletion of her then present voyage. After the completion of the voyage, and
when the plaintiff was ready to load the ship, she was detained as unsea-
worthy, and the repairs were not finished until more than two months after
the completion of the voyage. Held, that the plaintiff was entitled to throw
up the charter-party. Tnly v. Howling, 510.
14. A charter-party stipulated for certain acts by the freighters, and also that
the liability of the freighters was to cease as soon as cargo was on board, and
the ship-owner was to have a -lien on the cargo instead. This lien was held
to be substituted for the covenants of the freighters to do the acts mentioned,
and the only remedy for a breach was by enforcement of the lien on the cargo.
French v. Gerber, 639.
SLANDER.
1. It is error to instruct the jury in an action for slander, that the defence
of justification is odious when not sustained by the evidence, and such an
instruction cannot but influence the jury against the defendant. Corbley v.
Wilson, 63.
2. Words charging a clergyman with drunkenness, when spoken of him in
his office or calling, are actionable per se. Bayner v. Cowden, 106.
3. Witness is absolutely privileged as to anything he may say having refer-
ence to the inquiry upon which he is testifying. Seaman v. Netherclif, 319.
4. The words " A. B. stole windows from C. D.'s house," are not, of
themselves, in their ordinary and popular sense, actionable. Wing v. Wing,
319.
5. Evidence that slanderous words were uttered in the presence of members
of the plaintiff's family, is proof of publication. Hiller v. Johnson, 319.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. See CONTRACT, 14; VENDOn, 4 ; WARRANTY, 1.
Where the contract sought to be enforced is alleged to be one by which the
defendant was to take a lease of land, and the proof shows that she contracted
for the fee, the court will not compel her to accept a lease instead of a deed
in fee. Ellicott v. White, 63.
STATUTE. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, .1-24; EVIDENCE, 1; MUNICIPAL
ConPoaiATioN, 24; RAILROAD, 19.
1. A statute amending a prior statute by declaring that it shall read in a
given manner, has no retrospective effect. Kelsey, v. Kendall, 127.
2. A grant of land may be made by a law as well as a patent pursuant to a
law. Ryan v. Carter, 192.
3. The court need not interpret the proviso of a statute according to the
literal import of the words employed when the evident intention of the legis-
lature is different. Id.
4. The repeal ofstaitutes by implication is not favored, and will not be held
unless the two are incapable of being reconciled. Cooke v. Ford, 417.
5. A statute required agents of foreign corporations, before entering upon
their duties, to file the evidence of their authority with the county clerk,
together with the consent bf the corporation, that suits brought by residents
of the state on demands arising out of transactions with such agents, might
be commenced against the corporation by service of process upon such agent.
It then provided that whoever should act as such agent without complying
with the statute, should be subject to a fine of $50 ; and that "1 such tir.izn
corporation shall not enforce in any courts of this state any contracts. made
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by their agents or persons assuming to act as their agents, before a compliance
by such agents or persons acting as such, with the provisions" above recited.
Held, that a contract entered into by an agent before the filing of such autho-
rity and consent was not invalid by reason of such omission. Mowing and
Reaping Co. v. Caldwell, 554.
6. ]feldfurther, that the corporation may recover on such a contract, pro-,
vided such authority and consent are filed previous to the commencement of
suit; but the failure to file the same will be valid ground for a plea in abate-
ment. rd.
7. While it is a general role that contracts entered into in disregard of
statutory provisions are void, the rule is not inflexible, and any case mast be
considered an exception to it where from the statute the intention of the leg-
islature appears to be that the contract shall not be invalid, but that some
other consequence which the statute prescribes shall be the sole penalty. Id.
STREAML See RIPARIAN RWGlrs; WATERS AN WATERCOURSES.
STREET. See MeUIciPAL CORPORATION, 5; NEGLIGENCE, 8; NUISANCE.
SUBROGATION.
Equity will, as a matter of course, substitute in the place of a creditor a
person who advances money to pay the debt for which he is bound as surety.
Coe v. Mew Jersey Midland Railway Co., 127.
SUBSCRIPTION. See CORPORATiqN.
SUICIDE. See EVIDENCE, 10-12; INSANITY, 2; INsUrAxoE, 6.
SUNDAY.
A loan of money made on the Lord's day is void, and the promise to repay
it cannot be enforced. Meadier v. White, 319.
SURETY. Sea APPLICATION or PAYxENTS, 2; BA~imurTcy, 18; BILLS AND
NOTES, 10, 15 ; SUBROGATION.
1. A bond regular inform, cannot be avoided by a surety, upon the ground
that it was delivered in violation of a condition upon which it was signed by
such surety, such condition being that the principal should not make such
delivery until it was also signed- by a certain other person, and the obliges
having no notice of such condition. State v. Potter, 170.
2. Changing the rate of interest in a note from six to seven per cent. is a
material alteration. Harsh v. Klepper, 576.
3. A person taking a bond for the future good conductof an agent already
in his employment, must communicate to a surety his knowledge of the past
criminal misconduct of such agent. Sooy v. The State, 511.
TAXATION AND TAXES. See CovENANT, 3.
1. A contract restraining taxation must be shown to exist. There is no
presumption in its favor. It is in derogation of public right and narrows a
trust created for the good of all. West Wisconsin Railway Co. v. Board of
Supervisors of Trempealeau County, 192.
2. Where a state passes a law allowing a foreign insurance company to do
business in its limits on payment of certain fees and a tax upon its gross
receipts for premiums, this does not constitute or imply any contract that the
state or any municipal corporation having authority to tax, may not impose
an additional or different tax upon a company which has complied with such
law. Home ins. Co. v. City of Augusta, 256.
3. Estates in expectancy merely are within the Act of Congress of 1864,
taxing succession to real estate. Clapp v. Mason, 576.
4. In ejectment, where plaintiff claims under a tax deed, and defendant
under a patent from the United States, and it appears that the tax on which
plaintiff's deed was based must have been levied before the date of the patent,
and there is no proof of the date of entry of the land, it must be presumed that
the title to the land was in the United States when the tax was levied ; and
this presumption rebuts the primafacie evidence of the liability of the land to
taxation furnished by the tax deed. Treat v. Lawrence, 757.
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1. A telegraph company is the agent of the sender of telegram, and the lat-
ter is bound by the message as delivered. Saveland v. Green, 183.
2. No action will lie against a telegraph company at the suit of the receiver,
unless there be a contract between them, or fraud on the part of the company.
Dickson v. Reuter, 320.
TENANT IN COMIMON. See PARTITION.
A tenant in common, to show an ouster of his co-tenant must show acts of
possession inconsistent with the rights of such co-tenant, and such as would
amount to an ouster between landlord and tenant, and knowledge on the part
of co-tenant of his claim of exclusive ownership. Ghandler v. Ricker, 758.
TERM. See CouRTs, 3-6 ; JUDGMENT, 16.
TIMBER. See WASTE.
TIME. See BANxRUPTCY, 15, 16.
1. A day, in its ordinary meaning, is the space of twenty-four hours from
midnight to midnight. State v. Brown, 222.
2. Where a constitution provides for an election to fill a vacancy in the
office of judge "at the first election that occurs more than thirty days after the
vacancy shall have happened," the word " days" must be taken to be used
in its ordinary meaning; and therefore neither the day on which the vacancy
happens nor the day of the election can be included in computing the time. Id.
TORT.
1. A claim for damages for assault and.battery is not assignable. Averill
and Wife v. Longfdlow, 442.
2. Torts are always several, whatever number of persons unite in commit-
ting them ; and though defendant and one 0. were named together in an order
of the supervisors as having encroached upon a highway, it was not error to
reject evidence offered by defendant that he and 0. occupied in common the
land to which the obstruction was appurtenant. State v. Babcock, 703.
3. Effect of a release under seal, of one of three joint tort-feasors, upon the
right to recover against the others. Gunther v. Lee, 758.
TOWBOAT. See ADMIRALTY, 15.
TOWN MEETING. See ELECTIONS, 1.
TRADE-MARK.
1. Though geographical words and numerical characters of a descriptive
nature cannot be appropriated as trade-marks, courts of equity will restrain
the use of such words and characters where they are employed for purposes
of deceit. Kinney v. Basch et al., 596.. 2. A generic or geographical name is not subject to legal protection as a
trade-mark. Dunbar v. Glenn, 673.
3. But where such a name is employed simply for purposes of identification
and notoriety, it will be protected as a valid trade-mark. Ad.
TRAVELLER.- See INNHEEPrE, 2.
TRESPASS. See DAMAGES, 1.
1. In trespass for assault it is a good defence that plaintiff, although the
landlord of defendant, came on the premises and refused to leave and was put
out without unnecessary force, but if the landlord came for lawful purpose
the rule would be otherwise. Ayres v. Birtch, 511.
2. Digging a ditch on another's land is a completed trespass, and the cause
of action for all consequent injuries begins to run. His not going on the land
to fill up the ditch, which would be a new trespass, does not make him a con-
tinued trespasser. K. P. Railroad Co. v. A.Iihiman, 382.
3. In trespass qua. clan., it appeared that plaintiffs had paid taxes on the
locus in quo, and in surveying the gore of which it was a part, had surveyed
some of its outer lines. field, that those acts were not acts of possession, but
evidence of a claim of right merely. Paine 6- Slocuin v. Butchins, 704.
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TRIAL. See EVIDENCE, 5.
1. SOME NEw ASPECTS OF THE RIGHT OF TRIAL BY JURY, 705.
2. It is error to permit counsel to read to the jury the remarks of the court
on a motion for a new trial in the same ease, touching the weight of e'idence
or the credibility of the witnesses. Allaire's Heirs v. Allaire, 640.
S. But an objection, at tile trial, to the reading of such opinion, is too
broad, as such opinion, with respect to the law stated in it, could be lawfnlly
read to the jury. Id.
TRUST AND TRUSTEE. See GunImAx AND WAXD, 1 ; INsURAcE, 13-15;
ruBLIC SCHOOL, 2, 3.
1. A trustee cannot make profit out of his office, and this applies to all in
a fiduciary relation, whether technically called trustees or not. Hough v.
lairvey, 64.
2. A trustee making insurance is required to exercise due care in the selec-
tion of a company, but is not a guarantor. Gettins ir. Scudler, 64.
3. A bequest to a daughter "for her sole and separate use and so that her
husband shall not have any contract over or use of the same, her heirs and
assigns for ever," creates a trust to preserve the estate for her separate use.
Varner's Appeal, 64.
4. A devise and bequest of real and personal property " to the Roman Cath-
olic orphans" of a certain diocese, with a further provision in the will appoint-
ing plaintiff, the Roman Catholic bishop of said diocese, executor, and giving
him "power to sell the above property and use the proceeds for the benefit of
the Roman Catholic orphans," held void for uncertainty in the description of
the beneficiaries. Heiss v. Murphey, 192.
5. The cy pres doctrine has no application in Wisconsin. 1d.
6. A voluntary trustee without contract for compensation is not entitled to
it in equity, though he will be allowed his expenses and saved from loss.
Brooks v. Egbert, 256.
7. Under some circumstances a trustee may represent his beneficiaries in
all things relating to their common interest in the trust property. If he has
been made such a representative, his beneficiaries are not necessary parties to
a suit by him against a stranger to enforce the trust, or to one by a stranger
against him to defeat it, in whole or in part. Kerrison v. Stewart, 256.
8. Where a deed of trust authorizes the trustee to sell the land and pay
costs, commissions, liens on the land, &c., as well as the particular debt
secured, he is authorized and compellable to pay, out of the proceeds of the
sale, any judgment which may be a lien on the land at the time of the sale,
whether it existed at the time the deed was executed or not. Hall v. Gould,
316.
9. Where a guardian receives a conveyance of the estate of his ward in his
own name, he is to be regarded as holding the estate in trust. Foler v. Buck,
383.
10. Where an executrix, who was life-tenant of a certain stock of the estate,
assigned it as collateral security for the debt of some of the remaindermen,
Held, an abuse of the trust. Prall v. Hunil, 576.
11. Mere negligence of a trustee may be a breach of trust. Bichards v.
Seal, 704.
12. Ignorance of the act or default of a co-trustee is no excuse, if that igno-
rance results from neglect. Id.
13. A trust fund, so long as it can be traced, may be followed for the pur-
pose of enforcing the trust. Barwick v. White, 759.
14. A promissory note, taken by an administrator for proceeds of land of
his decedent, sold under an order of the Orphans' Court for the payment of
debts, and showing on its face the purpose for which it was given, is a trust
fund. Id.
15. Upon the death of the administrator, the assignment of the note by his
administratrix to pay his debts, is a breach of trust and a legal fraud, for
which the administratrix and her assignee are liable in equity. Id.
16. Lapse of time does not bar a direct trust as between the trustee and
cestul que trut; otherwise as to constructive trusts. Cartnell v. Perkins, 759.
17. The ceqtui que trust under a devise of a fund in trust being nnthorizid.




to act in his place : Held, that the son of the cestui que trust-a young man and
without property-was not such "suitable person." Bailey v. Bailey, 759.
TUGBOAT. See AD-IRALTY, 15.
ULTRA VIRES. See CoRPORLATIox, 28, 29; NATiONAT BANK; PURC
SCHOOL, 3.
THE DOCTRINE OF ULTRA. VIRES, 513.
UNITED STATES. See AGENT, 5; DAcAGES, 6; LANDLORD AND TENANT,
13.
UNITED STATES COURTS. See COURTS, 1, 2; ERROR AND APPEAL;
HABEAS CORPUS; JUDGMENT, 6, 15; WITNESS.
1. A-claim by B. on a fund of $6000 being allowed, C., another claimant,
excepted and appealed to the Supreme Court. It appearing that if C.'s view
was adopted the portion of the fund to come to him would be less than $2000
the appeal was dismissed. Terry v. Bank of Commerce, 63.
2. The power, conferred by sect. 359 of the Revised Statutes of the United
States on the attorney-general, to conduct and argue any case in any court
of the United States in which the United States is interested, does not authorize
him to bring such suit in his own name. Suits should be in the name of the
United States. Attorney-General v. The Rumford Chemical Works et al., 250.
3. The jurisdiction of the United States courts must appear from the record.
Ex parte Smith, 576.
USURY.
1. Where a commission merchant in Baltimore advanced to a pork packer
in Peoria $100,000, for which he was to receive interest at the rate of 10 per
cent. per annum, and a fixed commission for the sale of the product, to be paid
whether it was sold by the commission merchant or not, it was properly left
to the jury to decide whether or not the commissions were a cover for usury.
Cockle v. -lack, 281.
2-. The express agreement of 10 per cent. is not usurious, because lawful in
Illinois, though not so in Maryland : the contract being as much an Illinois as
a Maryland contract. Id.
3.. The plea of usury is a personal privilege, and if the debtor declines to
avail himself of it, no stranger to the transaction can. Pritchett v. Rollins,
883.
VENDOR AND PURCHASER. See SALE; WARRANY.
1. A contract was for the sale of a piece of land, "also a tract of coal pro-
perty ;" for the land the vendee "agrees to pay $2500, $20"0 to be paid on
delivery of the deeds and possession of the property; * * * the coal is to be
paid for at the rate of half a cent per bushel, payment to be made for the coal
at the end of each year; vendee agrees to use at least $1000 worth of coal at
half a cent a bushel each year." Hld, on its'face to be a divisible contract.
Graver v. Scott, 128.
2. Where the vendor of personal property reserves a lien upon it at the
time of sale, and the property is subsequently exchanged for other property
by the vendor's consent, with an agreement between him and the vendee that
his original lien shall attach to the property exchanged for, such lien can be
enforced. Kelsey v. Kenazll, 128.
3. It was agreed between A. and a trustee for an intended company, that
as soon as the company was formed and had adopted the agreement, A. should
sell, and the company purchase A.'s interest in a leasehold brick field, and
that on an assignment to the company being executed, the company should
pay him as the purchase-money 80001., in manner thereinafter mentioned,
namely, 60001. in cash and 2000l. in fully paid-up shares. The property was
assigned to the company by a deed which stated the consideration to be
16,000l., to be paid to A. as thereinafter mentioned, viz., fifty per cent. on
all sums of money to be received from sale of shares, and fifty per cent. on
all moneys borrowed by the company by way of capital until the 60001. was
paid. The company became abortive ; no money was ever received by sale
of shares, or borrowed, and ultimately the company was ordered to be wound
up. Held, that-the nature of the contract was such as to exclude the vendor's
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lien, and that A. had no lien on the leasehold premises. In re Brentwood
crkc and Coal Co., 448.
4. A party who, by his own negligence or default, has prevented or unrea-
sonably delayed the full execution of a contract for the sale of lands, will not
be relieved by a decree for specific performance. Kinney v. Redden, 256.
5. To entitle such a party to relief it must appear that he will, in conse-
quence of the part performance, suffer detriment, unless relieved, and that he
has been himself in no default. Id.
6. To entitle a purchaser to rescind his contract upon the ground of material
misrepresentations made by the vendor as to the title, it must appear that he
was actually misled by them. Gunby v. Slater, 383.
7. If the misrepresentations are material and substantial they vitiate the
contract, though made by mistake, being to the advantage of the party making
them. Id.
8. A purchaser, under a contract for the sale of land, who has accepted a
deed and entered into possession, will, nevertheless, be relieved in equity
against a defect of title afterwards discovered by him, if fraud in the sale was
practised upon him by the vendor. Houston v. Burley, 759.
9. The right to rescind a contract for fraud must be exercised promptly
after the discovery of it. Id.
VENUE.
The claim stated that plaintiffs and defendants were limited companies, with
registered offices in London, and that the action was brought for the rent of
a railway station in Buenos Ayres, and for part of the cost of constructing
lines of railway and approaches to the station. The statement of defence was
that both plaintiff and defendant were domiciled in Buenos Ayres and carried
on business there; that the premises in question were constructed on land
which was the property of the republic of Buenos Ayres, and that plaintiffs
and defundants were joint concessionaires under the republic of certain ease-
ments appurtenant thereto; that the construction of the premises was directed
by the government of Buenos Ayres, which by its laws had powers of adjusting
all rights arising out of such matter; that the contract, if any, as to the cost
of construction was made at Buenos Ayres and was subject to the law of the
place of contract, and that the republic had assumed jurisdiction over the
plaintiffs' claim. Held, on demurrer, that the defence was not good either on
the ground of venue or of the comity of nations, as both parties were within
the jurisdiction of the court and the facts alleged did not show that the juris-
diction of the Argentine Republic over the claim was exclusive. Buenos
Ayres and Ensenada Port Railroad Co. v. Northern Railroad Co. of Buenos
Ayres, 359.
VERDICT. See EvinxecH, 12.
WAGER. See CONRACT, I.
WAR. See CONTRACT, 4; IwsURwC, 12.
WAREHOUSE. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 6.
WARRANTY. See GUARANTY; PLEADING, 2; SALE; VENDOR.
1. A. agreed to grant to B. and C. a lease of a vein of coal, called S. vein,
on and under a farm called X., at 1001. per annum as certain or dead-rent,
and royalty of 9d. per ton, and other conditions. On action byA. for specific
performance, B. and C. alleged that the S. vein did not exist under the farm,
and it was proved that on a search it had not been found, but counter evidence
was given to show that the searches were insufficient: Held, that the agree-
ment was a license to enter and search for the vein, but not a warranty that
such a vein was to be found; and accordingly that A. was entitled to specific
performance of the contract whether the S. vein existed or not. Jefferys v.
Fairs, 320.
2. The vendor of an article sold for a particular purpose does not impliedly
warrant it against latent defects to him unknown, and caused hy the unskil-
fulness or negligence of the manufacturer or previous owner, except when the
sale is in itself equivalent to an affirmation that the article has certain in-
herent qualities inconsistent with the alleged defects. Bragg v. Morrill, 748.
812 INDEX.
WARRANTY.
3. Representations by the vendor of the quality of the thing sold, or of its
fitness for a particular purpose, intended as a part of the contract of sale, and
relied upon by the vendee, constitute a contract of warranty. Richardson v.
Grandy, 687.
4. And when there is such a contract, the vendee has a right of action, by
proving the contract and its breach, and is under no legal obligation to return
the property, or to give notice of its defects; his retention and use of it,
and neglect to give notice of its defects, being material only upon the question
of damages. Id.
WASTE.
1. The cutting of timber is an injury of an irreparitble nature and remedia-
ble in equity by whomsoever committed. Peinming v. Collins, 704.
2. Equity, having jurisdiction to restrain waste, will decree an account and
satisfaction for the waste committed, Id.
3. Upon the death of the party committing the waste the liability to accouut
survives against his administrators. Id.
WATERS AND WATERCOURSES. See EASEMENT, 5 ; MINES 2 ; RIPAIAN
RIGHTS.
1. Each state owns the beds of all tide-waters within its jurisdiction unless
they have been granted away. McCready v. State of Virginia, 574.
2. In like manner the states own the tide-waters themselves and the fish in
them, so far as they are capable of ownership while running. Id.
3. The state of Virginia granted the exclusive privilege to its own citizens
to plant oysters in Ware river, a stream in that state where the tide ebbs and
flows, and prohibited the citizens of other states from doing so : Held, that
the state had the right so to do, and that its action was not in conflict with the
federal constitution. Id.
4. In the location of a body of land for the benefit of soldiers the Com-
monwealth reserved 3000 acres on the east and north of the Ohio and Alle-
gheny rivers, and directed it to be laid out in lots for a town (afterwards
Allegheny City) ; some of the lots abutted on the north side of a street called
Bank lane, "as it runs by the courses of the river :" Held, that the title of the
lot-owners to the soil did not cross the street to the river. Allegheny City v.
Moorehead, 64.
5. The establishment of a harbor line in Rhode Island gives to proprietors
-within the line the privilege of filling out and extending their land to it.
Engs v. Peckham, 384.
6. Every man through whose land a stream of water runs is entitled to the
flow of that stream without diminution or alteration. Such right is inherent
in the land and passes by conveyance. Shamleffer v. Council Grove Mill Co.,
384.
7. A mill company, in 1874, with the assent of an upper riparian owner,
dug a channel through the lands of such owner from a point on the Neosho
river to its mill, and thereby diverted from its natural channel through the
land now belonging to plaintiff in error a portion of said stream, and this
without the assent of the then owner of said plaintiff in error's land : Held,
that thereby the mill company acquired no right to continue said diversion or
to restrain plaintiff in error from removing any obstruction, natural or artifi-
cial, in the bed of said river on his lands. Id.
WAY.
1. A way of strict necessity cannot be implied if there is any other way, how-
ever inconvenient, which will serve. O'Rorke v. Smith, 205.
2. Whether the grant of a way existing defacto can be implied except in
cases of strict necessity, queery. But if it can the claimant must show that
without the way he will be subjected to an expense excessive and dispropor-
tioned to the value of his estate, or that his estate clearly depends for its
appropriate enjoyment on the way, or that some conclusive indication of his
grantor's intention exists in the circumstances of his estate. Id.
3. Nothing passes as incident to the grant of a private way over one's land,




4. What is necessary for such reasonable and proper enjoyment of the way
granted, depends upon the terms of the grant and is a question for the jury.
Baker v. Frick, 760.
WHARF. See RIrARIAN RIGHTS, 6, 7, 10.
WILL. See EVIDENCE, IS ; PUBLIC SCHOOL, 2 ; INSANITY, 2.
1. Where a testator made a bequest to his wife of all his estate, "during
her life, and to do with as she sees proper before her death," the wife took a
life estate in the property, and her conveyance of the real property passed no
greater intbrest. Brant v. Virginit Coal 4- Iron Co., 403.
2. A testator made a general gift by will of his estate in trust for all his
children, who, being sons, should attain twenty-one, or being daughters, should
attain that ago or marry; the share of each of his sons to be for his own
absolute use and benefit. And he directed that the share of each of his daugh-
ters should be held upon trusts in effect for herself for life for her separate use,
and after her death for her children. The will contained provisions for sub-
stituting the issue of sons dying in the lifetime of the testator for the sons, but
no similar provision for the case of daughters. A daughter having died in
testator's lifetime, leaving children who survive himr held, that the gift of the
daughter's share did not fail, and that her children were entitled. In re Speak-
2nan. Unsworth v. Speakman, 448.
3. The deceased made a will, by which he left all his property to his wife
and made her sole executrix. He subsequently, with his wife, executed a joint
will, which was expressed to take effect in case they should be called out of
the world at one and the same time and by one and the same accident. By
this will they revoked all former wills. The deceased died in the lifetime of
his wife: Jel, that the joint will was dependent upon a contingency which
did not happen, and was, therefore, inoperative even to revoke a previous will.
In the Goods of lingo, 640.
4. A statute which requires that a will subscribed in the presence of the tes-
tator requires to be subscribed where the testator can see the witness subscribe ;
it is not sufficient that the witness, after signing out of the testator's sight,
brings such subscription to the attention of the testator, who assents to and
approves the act. Downie's Will, 704.
WITNESS. See BILLS AND NOTES, 16 ; EVDENCE, 15 ; SLANDER, 3.
1. An attorney is not a competent witness in a United States court to testify
to facts communicated to him by a client in his professional capacity, although
he would be competent by the law of the state in which such court may be sit-
ting. Com. Ins. Co. v. Sdaefer, 392.
2. The rules of evidence in the federal courts, not affecting rights of pro-
perty, are under the control of Congress, and the Acts of Congress have made
communications between counsel and client privileged. Id.
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